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PURSUING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PERPETRATORS OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: THE PERIL (AND
UTILITY?) OF SHAME
A. RACHEL CAMP

ABSTRACT
This Article explores the use of shame as an accountability intervention for
perpetrators of intimate partner abuse, urging caution against its legitimization.
Shaming interventions—those designed to publicly humiliate, denigrate, or
embarrass perpetrators or other criminal wrongdoers—are justified by some as
legitimate legal and extralegal interventions. Judges have sentenced
perpetrators of Intimate Partner Violence (“IPV”) to hold signs reading, “This
is the face of domestic abuse,” among other publicly humiliating sentences.
Culturally, society increasingly uses the Internet and social media to expose
perpetrators to public shame for their wrongdoing. On their face, shaming
interventions appear rational: perpetrators often belittle, humiliate, and
disgrace their partners within a larger pattern of physical abuse, and survivors
often report feeling an abiding sense of shame as a result. Further, perpetrators
are assigned en masse a dominant narrative about their motivations and traits
as controlling, violent, and beyond reform. Consequently, they are cast into a
category of individuals for whom traditional forms of rehabilitation are
identified as ineffective and for whom shaming may be particularly apropos.
However, even if stigmatizing perpetrators to achieve accountability has
some legitimate purpose, any benefit is outweighed by the fact that shaming
perpetrators undermines the goals of violence reduction and survivor safety.
Internalized shame can lead to externalized violence, thereby increasing, rather
than decreasing, a survivor’s risk of harm. Further, using shame to punish an
act that is itself built on shame can blur clarity about socially acceptable
behavior, have a profound social and economic impact on the individual
shamed, and devastate a person’s dignity and sense of self-worth. Moreover,
many perpetrators have cumulative shaming experiences in their pasts,
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intensifying the negative consequences that can flow from shaming
interventions. To understand the unique risks of shaming in the context of IPV,
this Article explores shame as a tool for achieving perpetrator accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.1
In 2017, a judge in Guilford County, North Carolina convicted three men of
domestic violence misdemeanors. Their sentence? To spend hours over the
course of several days standing outside the courthouse holding signs that read
“This is the face of domestic abuse.”2 Though fervently criticized by some,
formal shaming sanctions like this one from North Carolina are steadily used.3
Judges across the United States impose shaming sentences as an alternative to
more traditional sentences in a variety of cases, including cases involving
Intimate Partner Violence (“IPV”).4 While shaming wrongdoers may be
identified as empowering for victims and may have utilitarian benefits on
maladaptive behavior in particular contexts, within the context of IPV nearly all
of the benefits are outweighed by shame’s tendency to undermine the goals of
violence reduction and survivor safety. Shaming perpetrators risks making
survivors more vulnerable, not less.
Shaming can be brought about by legal interventions, formally and statesanctioned, and through extralegal interventions, informally by one individual
or a group. In either context, shaming interventions are designed to publicize a
wrongdoer’s illegal or immoral conduct “in a way intended to reinforce the
prevailing social norms that disapprove of such behavior” and to cause an
unpleasant emotional experience in the wrongdoer.5 In the context of IPV,
Attributed to Mahatma Gandhi.
See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing this example and numerous others of courts
imposing shaming sentences on perpetrators of IPV).
3 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW 1 (2004) (“Penalties like these, involving public shaming of the offender, are
becoming increasingly common as alternatives to fines and imprisonment.”); David Karp,
The Judicial and Judicious Use of Shame Penalties, 44 CRIME & DELINQ. 277, 277 (1998)
(“One avenue of experimentation gaining popularity is the use of shame penalties as a
judicial sanction.”); Toni Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform,
3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 646 (1997) (describing revival of public interest in
publicly shaming criminal offenders). Some scholars have called on our criminal justice
system to revive physical punishments as an alternative to incarceration. See PETER
MOSKOS, IN DEFENSE OF FLOGGING 2 (2011) (arguing that flogging is less cruel than
incarceration as form of punishment). For a discussion on the dominant critiques of shame
as a legal sanction, see Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84
TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2076 (2006).
4 See infra Part II (detailing numerous situations in which courts rely on shaming
interventions as substitute for incaraceration in IPV cases).
5 Dan Schwarcz, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming
Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2187 (2003). As recently as May
2018, feminist Germaine Greer experienced swift public backlash for her comments that
often what women report as rape is just “bad sex,” but less discussed in the media was her
call for tattooing an “r” on a rapist’s hand, arm, or cheek. Ceylan Yeginsu, Author Calls
for Easing of Penalty for Rapes, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2018, at A4.
1
2
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shaming interventions may be used to achieve three theoretical goals: (1)
retribution, by punishing the perpetrator in an effort to express intolerance for
IPV; (2) rehabilitation, by assuming that moral education flows from public
humiliation; and (3) survivor validation and empowerment, by humiliating or
degrading the person who caused her harm.6 Formal shaming interventions may
also demonstrate communal moral condemnation of a perpetrator and his
behavior while avoiding the deficiencies long identified in our modern carceral
system, as shaming sentences are often ordered in lieu of incarceration.7
Shaming perpetrators may seem like a particularly apropos intervention given
the tactics many commonly use. Some perpetrators commonly belittle,
humiliate, or disgrace their partners within a larger pattern of abuse or violence,
and survivors often report an abiding sense of shame as a result.8 Thus, shaming
as a sanctioned intervention is often righteously defended as justifiable
payback.9 Relatedly, there is a cultural assignment en masse of a dominant
narrative about perpetrators’ motivations and traits. This narrative places
perpetrators within a group of wrongdoers for whom traditional forms of
rehabilitation are assumed not to work and, therefore identifying them as
deserving persons to shame. Justifying shame as a “deserved” or “fair”
alternative intervention for achieving behavior modification assumes a defined
distinction between the moral “rightness” of survivors and a moral “wrongness”
of perpetrators. In reality, however, that distinction is imprecise. Many
perpetrators of IPV have had multiple shaming experiences over their lifetimes,
including those arising from poverty, family-of-origin abuse, and other
childhood victimization.10 Consequently, many perpetrators are survivors of
their own traumatic, and often shameful, experiences. Formal or informal public
shaming of individuals who have had cumulative experiences with shame
contravenes what is understood about creating optimal conditions for changing
maladaptive or abusive patterns of behavior for the better.
Shaming interventions also ignore what is understood about internalized
shame and externalized violence. Shame is among the most uncomfortable
emotions that a human can feel. It often leads to profound embarrassment, a

6 Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 734,
738-39 (1998) (“Punishments should aim to reflect back on the offender what he has done
to his victim, which is the essence of the talionic principle.”).
7 Kahan, supra note 3, at 2075.
8 See Judith Lewis Herman, Justice from the Victim’s Perspective, 11 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 571, 572-73 (2005) (identifying how some perpetrators often seek to
“establish . . . dominance not only by terrorizing the victim but also, often most effectively,
by shaming her”).
9 See id. at 594 (describing how some survivors identify that they wished for “the
extreme consequence of shunning and community ostracism” and how perpetrators, not
survivors, “would be the ones to look down in shame”).
10 See infra Part III (describing how perpetrators of IPV have experienced shame).
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sense of unworthiness, and a destructive loss of dignity.11 Many who experience
these consequences seek ways to diminish their intensity. While some
individuals may exhibit shame’s impact through isolation or self-harm, others
may engage in increased externalized aggression, including towards the party
perceived as being responsible for the imposition of their shame.12 As a result,
when society legitimizes public humiliation or degradation of IPV perpetrators,
it jeopardizes survivors’ safety and stability, and violence reduction generally.
Further, many survivors return to, or stay with, their abusive partners following
formal or informal shaming, increasing the risk to survivors of shame’s negative
consequences and the likelihood of survivor shaming as a result of their
relational decision.13
This Article explores these and other risks to perpetrators and survivors when
shame is used as an intervention for perpetrator accountability. Part I defines
shame and its impact, exploring shame as emotional response and shame as
intervention. Part I further considers the correlation between shame, aggression,
and IPV. Part II explores formal uses of shame within the broad context of IPV.
It begins with an overview of the legal history of shame as an accountability tool
and turns to modern uses of shame. Part II considers the shaming experiences
of perpetrators and survivors in order to advance a consistent, feminist, and
value-driven approach to the treatment of any party within and beyond a
courtroom. To understand the unique harms that arise from shaming
perpetrators, Part III explores the social and economic conditions that contribute
to shame-proneness and that are correlated with IPV perpetration, including
poverty, adverse childhood experiences, and trauma. Finally, Part IV appeals to
policymakers, judges, and anti-IPV advocates to reject denigrating interventions
and instead commit to dignity-driven approaches to perpetrator accountability.
Within the legal system specifically, Part IV proposes interventions that move
beyond the standard menu currently used to those that earnestly attempt to
address the social conditions associated with perpetrators, shame, and IPV.14
See infra Part I (exploring shame’s psychological impact on individuals).
See infra Part I (arguing that shaming perpetrators may actually cause perpetrators to
re-abuse their partners).
13 See infra Part II (hypothesizing that shaming perpetrators may cause society to also
shame their partners and enhance culture of survivor blame).
14 In this Article, I use the terms “intimate partner violence” and “domestic violence”
interchangeably to refer to physical violence perpetuated or experienced in intimate
relationships. Abuse is used to describe behavior that may include physical violence, but
also other behaviors that lead to domination and control. Throughout this Article, I also
intentionally resist the term “batterer” because of the sociopolitical understanding of
“batterers” and the cultural assumptions tied to that term. Instead, I identify men who
engage in IPV as “perpetrators.” I recognize that using any one word to describe a broad
group of individuals can lead to connotations or assumptions that are inaccurate for those
within that group. My intention, albeit imperfectly, is to shift the narrative from
assumptions about the person—assumptions captured in “batterer”—to the behavior the
person has engaged in. However, while “perpetrator” may be more politically neutral than
11
12
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DISCERNING THE IMPACT OF SHAME AND THE INTENT OF SHAMING

Shame is a multidefinitional concept. It is both an emotion and an action—
one can feel shame and one can be shamed.15 Shame can be externally imposed
by others as a result of an actual or perceived wrongdoing, and it can arise from
one’s internal response to their assessment of harm that they have caused others.
While shame can be a critical emotion for gaining empathy and understanding,
experiencing shame also can have detrimental personal consequences. To assess
the utility and risks of using shame as an intervention for perpetrators demands,
first, an understanding of this complex concept.
A.

Shame’s Psychological Impact

Shame is a powerful and often deeply uncomfortable emotion. Shame has
been described as a public emotion or a “relational phenomenon” because of its
link to others’ perceptions or the belief that others will learn of one’s moral
transgression or socially contrary behavior.16 Shame often arises from a belief
that others will reject or disapprove of the harming person17 and can have a
profoundly negative impact on a person’s view of his worthiness, dignity, or

“batterer” in the context of IPV, it also carries similar or different assumptions from
“batterer.” See infra Section IV.A (describing how society’s perceptions about individuals
change based merely on labels assigned); see also Mimi Kim et al., Plenary 3—Harms of
Criminalization and Promising Alternatives, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 369,
381 (2015) (noting choice not to use “language of law enforcement,” including words like
“perps, perpetrators, [and] offenders”); Beyond Offender and Victim, VERA INST. JUST.,
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/commonjustice/pages/79/attachments/original/15
06607563/common-justice-on-language.pdf?1506607563 [https://perma.cc/XD V3-597P]
(last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (advocating for replacing “offender” and “victim” with
“responsible party” and “harmed party”). Finally, because this Article explores the legal
system’s modern response to perpetrator accountability building from the historical
treatment of men as perpetrators and women as their victims, this Article examines shame
within the context of male violence perpetuated against women. The unique shame that can
result from relationships where violence is perpetuated by women against men or within
non-heteronormative relationships is critical to expanding understanding of shame’s role
in IPV. I hope to explore those experiences in a subsequent article.
15 Massaro, supra note 3, at 672 (identifying that “shame” conflates three concepts:
shame, shameful, and shaming). As noted by Massaro, “Shame is the internal reaction:
shame the emotion. What is shameful is a normative judgment imposed onto behaviors,
desires, or other entities. Shaming is an external action: shame the verb.” Id.
16 ROBERT WALKER, THE SHAME OF POVERTY 154 (2014) (“In effect, their words and
experiences corroborated the notion that shame is a relational phenomenon, not something
that is self-imposed.”). Martha Nussbaum defines shame as “a painful emotion responding
to a sense of failure to attain some ideal state.” NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 184.
17 See June Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig & Debra J. Mashek, Moral Emotions and Moral
Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345, 349 (2011) (describing belief that individuals who
experience shame have negative view of self rather than merely negative view of their
behavior).
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sense of ability to change maladaptive behaviors.18 These negative effects of
shame have been described as “a feeling of numbness and deadness” and “the
absence of warmth.”19
Shame is closely related to the emotion of guilt. Shame and guilt are both
defined as “moral emotions,” as they are linked to communally defined
standards of behavior.20 Though it can be difficult to distinguish shame from
guilt (indeed, a person may feel both emotions simultaneously), shame leads to
“a negative evaluation of the entire self vis-à-vis social and moral standards.”21
Alternatively, a person experiencing guilt often recognizes “specific behaviors
(not the self) that are inconsistent with such standards.”22 Shame can lead a
person to identify herself as “being” a particular kind of person whereas guilt is
typically a response to “doing” something—a behavior—that violates one’s
sense of right and wrong.23 By way of illustration, when a person forgets a
friend’s birthday or says something insensitive to an unhappy child, that person
may feel guilt for not responding in a way that maps on to that person’s values—
friendship; kindness; patience. That person also might feel shame by
internalizing what her missteps mean about the kind of person she is—a bad
friend; a horrible mother; an unworthy spouse. This distinction between “doer”
and “deed” is critical to distinguishing shame from guilt.24 Because shame is
directed internally, it is a much more personal, enduring, and potentially selfdefining emotion than guilt.25 One’s experience with shame can remain with
18 Ruth Buczynski, Guilt vs. Shame [Infographic], NAT’L INST. FOR THE CLINICAL
APPLICATION OF BEHAV. MED., https://www.nicabm.com/guilt-vs-shame/ [https://perma
.cc/AF2D-UQYK] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (“Shame is caused by an innate sense of
being worthless or inherently defective.”).
19 JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED 249 (2015).
20 Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, supra note 17, at 345 (“Moral emotions represent a key
element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and
moral behavior.”); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 207 (comparing characteristics of
shame and guilt, among other emotions); Massaro, supra note 3, at 660 (distinguishing guilt
from shame, but noting that both emotions are at least partially global); Buczynski, supra
note 18 (noting that causes of feeling shame or guilt involve communal factors).
21 Jeffrey Stuewig et al., Shaming, Blaming, and Maiming: Functional Links Among the
Moral Emotions, Externalization of Blame, and Aggression, 44 J. RES. PERSONALITY 91,
91 (2010); see Diego Zavaleta Reyles, The Ability to Go About Without Shame: A Proposal
for Internationally Comparable Indicators of Shame and Humiliation, 35 OXFORD DEV.
STUD. 405, 408-09 (2007) (“[Shame] is both a moral emotion (in the sense that it acts as an
evaluator of self) and has relational aspects (as actions by others, or one’s perception of
their judgement, may affect one’s sense of shame).”).
22 Stuewig et al., supra note 21, at 91; see Reyles, supra note 21, at 408-09 (“[O]ne can
humiliate or be humiliated, but always in relation to someone or something.”).
23 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 16, at 36 (noting that “‘guilt is about what one did’ and
shame is about ‘what one is’”).
24 See id.
25 See id. at 39.
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him for a short period or can leave a permanent scar on his sense of self-worth—
a potential lifetime of believing that, no matter what behavioral or cognitive
changes he makes in response to his shameful act, he is unredeemable.
Experiencing shame can be fundamentally self-altering.
Whether shame, as opposed to guilt or any other emotion, will be experienced
from wrongdoing and, if experienced, how it will impact an individual, is
exceedingly difficult to predict. In exploring this aspect of shame, Professor
Toni Massaro writes:
Any serious effort to define or elicit shame, or to predict its behavioral effects,
must consider that shame is ill understood, even by the emotion theorists who
have studied it in depth. Indeed, the specific triggers and behavioral
consequences of all emotions, including embarrassment, shame, and
humiliation, are extremely variable and elusive, so that one cannot know in
advance what the impact of shaming a person might be: The emotional impact
may range from none, to mild discomfort, to a profound and complete loss of
self that inspires a desire to die.26
Shame leads not only to negative outcomes but, for many individuals, can
lead to beneficial ones. When experienced within certain conditions, shame can
have a “positive moral impact” on a person, despite the discomfort it may
simultaneously cause.27 Feeling ashamed helps humans develop social
competence and can lead to modification of harmful behavior.28 Shame also can
increase one’s empathy through gained clarity about how his harmful behavior
negatively impacted the aggrieved person or violated the harming person’s value
system. Individuals who engage in criminal or immoral behavior—as identified
“from the perspective of self, other, or both”—and who feel ashamed as a result
of that behavior may more effectively rehabilitate than those who fail to

Massaro, supra note 3, at 655.
Dustyn Coontz, Beyond First Blush: The Utility of Shame as a Master Emotion in
Criminal Sentencing, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 415, 443 (2015) (noting that shame can have
positive moral impact even if person feels bad while experiencing it).
28 See VERA INST. JUST., supra note 14 (“[Accountability] includes assuming
responsibility for one’s actions by acknowledging one’s role and agency in causing harm,
recognizing the impact of one’s actions on others, working to repair that harm to the extent
possible, and upholding a commitment not to cause further harm.”). Philosopher Martha
Nussbaum refers to the positive elements of shame as “constructive” shame. See, e.g.,
NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 216 (describing instances in which feeling shame is positive);
Nathan Harris, Shame in Criminological Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4809, 4814 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014) (detailing
how shame can be constructive emotion in some situations); Shame and Pride
Management, JOHN BRAITHWAITE: WAR, CRIME, REG., http://johnbraithwaite.com/shameand-pride-management/ [https://perma.cc/ME6Z-28F6] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018)
(“[W]hen shaming is done within a cultural context of respect for the offender, it can be an
extraordinarily powerful, efficient and just form of social control.”).
26
27
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experience feelings of shame.29 Shame can help a person learn “what is
acceptable and unacceptable in a society, organization, group, or family—in any
interpersonal setting.”30 These positive outcomes of shame are most attainable
when an individual is in a position to change his or her circumstances or to
change the conditions recognized as contributing to the harming behavior.31
How a person responds to the emotion of shame in light of a transgression or
wrongdoing depends, in large part, on that person’s internal moral compass—
what behaviors he defines as right or wrong; harmful or acceptable. One’s
response also depends on one’s shame-proneness: an internal measure of a
person’s past experiences with shame.32 The more shame a person has in his
past, the less likely he will see a path towards rehabilitation. Further, one’s
experience with feeling or expressing shame can be culturally driven: in some
communities, expressing shame is itself considered shameful. As a result,
certain “individuals may ‘sanction themselves’ against exhibiting” their feeling
of shame.33 Withholding one’s feeling of shame may induce others to accuse
that person of “shamelessness,” leading to additional stigmatization that furthers
the feeling of shame.34 A person feeling shame can also lead to increased
feelings of shame as “one can become ashamed because one is ashamed,
or angry because one is ashamed, then ashamed because one is
angry . . . gathering increasing force with time, and potentially leading to
depression or self-harm.” 35 In short, shame is among the most
complicated and unpredictable emotions that human beings navigate.
B.

Shame and Aggression

Individuals who experience the negative consequences of shame often seek
ways to diminish their intensity. Some do so through rectifying the harm they
have caused. In situations where a person has engaged in IPV, for example,
rectification may lead to an apology, payment for damages or harm that resulted
from the abuse, pleading guilty to criminal charges, or agreeing to the entry of
29 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 69-83 (1989) (discussing
why and how shaming can be effective in controlling misbehavior by adults); Chris
Poulson, Shame: The Root of Violence 6-7 (2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (“When an individual is able to perceive that one has transgressed a boundary
and/or engaged in an inappropriate behavior (from the perspective of self, other, or both),
the experience of shame can signal the need to change behavior.”).
30 Poulson, supra note 29, at 6.
31 WALKER, supra note 16, at 48.
32 See infra Part III (describing structural sources that make one more prone to shame,
including poverty and child abuse).
33 WALKER, supra note 16, at 39.
34 Id. (suggesting that individuals who attempt to hide their shame are further
stigmatized by community).
35 Terry F. Taylor, The Influence of Shame on Posttrauma Disorders: Have We Failed
to See the Obvious?, 6 EUROPEAN J. PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY, no. 1, 2015, at 4.
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a civil protection order (“CPO”). For others, denial, abdication, and blaming
others for their harmful behavior may be their response to feeling shame.
Still others turn to aggressive or violent behavior.
Aggression can serve to diminish “the intensity of shame and replace it as far
as possible with its opposite, pride, thus preventing the individual from feeling
overwhelmed by the feeling of shame.”36 While guilt has been found to be an
emotion that gives direction—making the harmful behavior clear, creating a
path forward for a wrongdoer to make reparations—shame can prevent a
person from seeing a path towards change because it can cause a person
to believe that his core self, not his behavior, is flawed. That inability to
fix oneself can be frustrating or humiliating, and can be a root cause of
increased aggression or other harmful behaviors, including the same behavior
for which that person now feels ashamed.37 Aggressive acts that result from
feeling shame can lead to internally directed harm—e.g., substance abuse,
suicidal ideation, or suicide completion—or harm that is externally directed.38
For some shamed individuals, “lashing out at others” serves as a self-protective
act.39 Perceived power through violence provides an opportunity, even if only
temporarily, to restore a shamed person’s self-image or regain a sense of
agency and control. 40 As one researcher noted, “While on the positive side,
the experience of shame serves as a driver for constructive change, on the
negative side it serves to reduce self-esteem and self-worth, and may accumulate

Poulson, supra note 29, at 12; cf. Stuewig et al., supra note 21, at 97 (finding no direct
relationship between shame and aggression, though finding indirect relationship between
shame and aggression through externalization of blame).
37 See JUNE PRICE TANGNEY & RONDA L. DEARING, SHAME AND GUILT 90-95 (Peter
Salovey ed., paperback ed. 2004) (evaluating link between shame and interpersonal
hostility); Stuewig et al., supra note 21, at 91 (“Overwhelming feelings of shame and guilt
may cause individuals to aggress.”); Shame and Batterer Intervention, CTR. ON VIOLENCE
AND RECOVERY, N.Y.U. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://centeronviolenceandrecovery.org/blog/
2015/4/17/shame-and-batterer-intervention [https://perma.cc/LT35-LUFJ]
(“[I]nterventions that rely on punitive, anti-therapeutic responses can be seen as shame
inducing themselves and thus might contribute to continued incidents of partner abuse.”);
infra Section II.C.1 (explaining best practices for preventing wrongdoers from repeating
maladaptive behavior).
38
See CTR. ON VIOLENCE AND RECOVERY, supra note 37 (stating that people seek to
suppress intensity and pain of shame by inflicting harm to themselves).
39 Massaro, supra note 3, at 656 (noting varied behavioral consequences of shame).
40 Stuewig et al., supra note 21, at 92 (“Feeling powerlesss and in pain, shamed
individuals may become angry, blame others, and aggressively lash out in an attempt to
regain a sense of agency and control.”); see NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 184, 235 (noting
that casting shame upon offenders leads to greater sense of alienation for offender, which
could lead to greater violence); Massaro, supra note 3, at 671 (“Often, this restoration [of
the self] is impossible, and only physical withdrawal will ease one’s sense of shame.”).
36
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over time until a point of overload is reached. It is this overload that seems most
associated with violence.”41
Certain individuals, particularly those with cumulative experiences of
wrongdoing (or perceived wrongdoing) followed by shaming experiences, may
begin to act in ways consistent with the asserted or implied stigmatization—a
“criminal”; a “delinquent”; a “batterer.”42 Indeed, there is a strong correlation
between shame and individuals who engage in criminal behavior. According to
psychologist James Gilligan, shame was a unifying emotion among hundreds of
violent prisoners he interviewed:
The secret is that they feel ashamed—deeply ashamed, chronically ashamed,
acutely ashamed, over matters that are so trivial that their very triviality
makes it even more shameful to feel ashamed about them, so that they are
ashamed even to reveal what shames them. . . . [N]othing is more shameful
than to feel ashamed.43
Consistent with Dr. Gilligan’s findings, IPV perpetration and past experiences
with shame are linked. While a child witnessing physical aggression between
his parents is an identified predictor of adult perpetration of violence, when
parental physical violence is controlled for, childhood shaming experiences—
those that result in humiliation of the child by his parents in front of others;
unpredictable or random punishments; or “parental treatment that affect[s] the
[child’s] whole self”—have been found to be more strongly correlated with
adult perpetration of partner violence.44 Part III explores the connection between
IPV perpetration and childhood shame further.
Perpetrators of IPV often identify being shamed by the person they harm
as the “cause” for their abuse.45 Consequently, exploring shame as a factor
Poulson, supra note 29, at 7.
See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 29, at 22 (describing how individuals’ failures or
perceived failures produce shame, which results in these individuals banding together to
set up their own delinquent value systems).
43 JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS ON A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC 111 (1997).
44 These three criteria were derived from a twenty-two item “shame scale” which
aggregated reports of parental actions related to shaming. Donald G. Dutton, Cynthia van
Ginkel & Andrew Starzomski, The Role of Shame and Guilt in the Intergenerational
Transmission of Abusiveness, 10 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 121, 123 (1995). Childhood
shaming experiences can include emotional or physical abuse or other displays by the
parent that a child is not lovable. As noted by Gilligan, “Violence—whatever else it may
mean—is the ultimate means of communicating the absence of love by the person inflicting
the violence.” GILLIGAN, supra note 43, at 47.
45 See Jac Brown, Shame and Domestic Violence: Treatment Perspectives for
Perpetrators from Self Psychology and Affect Theory, 19 SEXUAL & RELATIONSHIP
THERAPY 39, 47 (2004) (noting “perpetrators frequently justify their violence in terms of
unfair treatment by their partner”); Kris Henning, “I Didn’t Do It, but If I Did I Had a Good
Reason”: Minimization, Denial, and Attributions of Blame Among Male and Female
Domestic Violence Offenders, 20 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 131, 131 (2005) (finding that both male
and female perpetrators of IPV “attribute greater blame for the recent offense to their
41
42
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that contributes to violence in intimate relationships might be perceived as antifeminist, blaming victims, or reinforcing excuses for abusive behavior. Yet, to
craft effective responses to IPV when it happens, and to seek to prevent it from
happening in the first place, demands understanding and exploring the
experiences of the survivor and the perpetrator. By understanding shame’s role
in IPV perpetration, anti-IPV advocates, lawyers, and judges can be better
informed about the impact of various accountability interventions, particularly
those that intentionally or implicitly denigrate a perpetrator’s dignity and the
resulting counterproductive outcomes those interventions may have on the
survivors they are designed to empower.46
C.

The Intent of Shaming: Reintegrative or Stigmatizing

Beyond one’s internal reaction to an experience or intervention, shame can
be externally imposed by others following an actual or perceived wrongdoing.47
As discussed in the Introduction, the external imposition of shame can be
experienced informally (e.g., an Internet callout) or formally (e.g., judicial
orders). Predicting whether a shamed person will respond to a particular
intervention in maladaptive or productive ways often depends on the context
within which shame is imposed.48 Criminologist John Braithwaite and others
have identified those contexts as falling into two general categories—shame
intended to reintegrate the wrongdoer and shame intended to stigmatize him.49

spouse/partner than they acknowledge for themselves”); Stuewig et al., supra note 21, at
92 (noting that “shamed individuals may become angry, blame others, and aggressively
lash out in an attempt to regain a sense of agency and control”); June P.Tangney, Jeffrey
Stuewig & Andres G. Martinez, Two Faces of Shame: The Roles of Shame and Guilt in
Predicting Recidivism, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 799, 799 (2014) (“When shamed, people want to
escape, hide, deny responsibility, and blame other people.”).
46 See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and
the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 290
(2005) (“[T]hus, the solution for male intimate violence was arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration of offenders. Although such recommendations are important, they do not
incorporate or address the material, social, and economic concerns of women survivors.”).
Understanding these conditions is not meant to excuse violence. As asserted by Gilligan,
“Explanations are not to be confused with exculpations, or justifications; they serve an
altogether different set of purposes, namely, causal understanding and primary prevention.”
GILLIGAN, supra note 43, at 54; see Reyles, supra note 21, at 408 (emphasizing importance
of studying influence of relationship between shame and poverty conditions on
individuals).
47 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 16, at 132 (describing shame among poor people as
“internally felt but also externally imposed”).
48 Id. (stating community intention of reacceptance helps define whether shame will be
reintegrative or stigmatizing).
49 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 29, at 55 (noting shame as punishment for crime may be
counterproductive when it is stimatizing rather than reintegrative).
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Reintegrative—or constructive—shame seeks to hold wrongdoers publicly
accountable for the harm they have caused, paired with a goal of reintegrating
that wrongdoer into a community, family, or other group from which his
maladaptive behavior led to, or could have led to, exclusion.50 While
disapproval for the harmful behavior is communicated within a reintegrative
context, the individual himself is not denigrated.51 Instead, reintegrative shaming
publicly disapproves of the behavior while also displaying public respect for the
individual and promoting forgiveness and acceptance.52 As explored in Part IV,
reintegrative shame serves as a foundation for most restorative justice models
and is rooted in a philosophy of dignity preservation.
In contrast, stigmatizing—or disintegrative—shame arises when an
intervention humiliates, shuns, or degrades a person for his committed wrong.53
Stigmatizing shame “encourages offenders to view themselves as outcasts”
and/or encourages others to treat offenders as outcasts.54 Similar to the
distinction between shame and guilt, stigmatizing shame does not separate the
behavior from the person, often conflating the wrongdoing with the
wrongdoer.55 Stigmatizing shame can be intended to cause—and often results
in—social exclusion and isolation.56 Indeed, some stigmatized individuals
remove themselves from their “social support network to avoid the potential
embarrassment of being discovered.”57 In response to Delaware becoming the
final state to abolish public physical punishmentspunishments that are

50 See id. at 4 (“[S]haming controls crime when it is . . . bounded by ceremonies to
reintegrate the offender back into the community of responsible citizens.”); NUSSBAUM,
supra note 3, at 211 (defining constructive shame).
51 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 29, at 55 (emphasizing importance of “ensuring the
deviance label is applied to the behavior rather than the person” in reintegration).
52 JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., SHAME MANAGEMENT THROUGH REINTEGRATION 32
(2001) (“The theory of reintegrative shaming contends there are a number of things we can
do to reduce the risk of stigmatization when wrongdoing is so serious that we are morally
required to confront it rather than let it go. We can communicate our disapproval of the act
while affirming the person as an essentially good person.”).
53 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 29, at 55 (“[T]he defining characteristic of
stigmatization as assignment of a deviant characteristic to the person as a master status.”).
54 Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 2193 (noting that stigmatizing shame results in offenders
being more likely to associate with others who are perceived to be against mainstream
standards, thus perpetuating their treatments as “outcast”).
55 Harris, supra note 28, at 4810 (explaining stigmatizing shame “occurs when
disapproval is directed at the person as well as at the offensive behavior”).
56
David Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 300, 302 (2000) (“The threat of social exclusion, of not being
regarded as a worthy member of the community, is the primary sanction in a shame
penalty.”).
57 Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 2199 (stating offender “may refrain from reaching out to
his friends for fear that they have learned of his conviction”).
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distinctly stigmatizingin 1972, the New York Times captured this observation
on how stigmatizing interventions can impact a wrongdoer:
Without the hope that springs eternal in the human breast, without some
desire to reform and become a good citizen, and the feeling that such a thing
is possible, no criminal can ever return to honorable courses. . . . With his
self-respect destroyed and the taunt and sneer of public disgrace branded upon
his forehead, he feels himself lost and abandoned by his fellows.58
Social isolation from stigmatizing shame can lead to increased criminal or
other antisocial behavior through the “associat[ion] with others who are
perceived in some limited or total way as also at odds with mainstream
standards.”59 For example, a young person who has been punished and
stigmatized by others multiple times over his life may seek out “subcultures
which reject the rejectors” to regain status and identity.60 In fact, within certain
subgroups, engaging in socially contrary behavior is identified as a positive and
valued attribute,61 and serves as a powerful anecdote to the negative
consequences of shame.
To be clear, one feeling shame is not alone sufficient to establish that an
intervention or punishment is stigmatizing, or intended to cause shame. Even
when an intervention is imposed with an intention to reintegrate, a person may
still feel stigmatized. In exchange for advancing a social interest in expressing
moral intolerance for certain behaviors, all legal punishments or interventions
have the potential to embarrass or ostracize a person.62 Criminal convictions,
CPOs, restorative justice conferences, and probation requirements may be
standard accountability interventions, but nonetheless may lead to feelings of

RONSON, supra note 19, at 55.
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 29, at 67 (“Stigmatization is the most important of those
life circumstances that increase the attraction of individuals to criminal subcultures.”); Shea
W. Cronin, Reintegrative Shaming & Restorative Justice, B.U. METROPOLITAN C.,
https://learn.bu.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-1942479-dt-content-rid-6162758_1/courses/14sprg
metcj602_ol/week06/metcj602_W06L01T04_Reintegrative.html [https://perma.cc/ANL2
-RK2D] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (noting “mechanism linking disintegrative shaming to
further criminal behavior is the breakdown in bonds to the group and/or acceptance of
criminal subcultures”).
60 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 29, at 102; Cronin, supra note 59 (providing when people
are stigmatized by punishment, they feel isolated and “seek out subcultures supportive of
crime or delinquency”).
61 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 81
(1963) (explaining individuals with “secret differences,” or stigma, will seek out
subcultures where “they need not try to conceal their stigma” because they have “chosen
the company of those with the same or a similar stigma”).
62 Harris, supra note 28, at 4810 (“Strong social norms against criminality, which arise
through community activism, are seen as critical to low crime rates because they engender
a culture in which crime is unthinkable because people come to see it as abhorrent.”).
58
59
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shame in a person experiencing them.63 Conversely, using shaming punishments
that are intended to stigmatize does not mean that a person will feel shame.64 A
person may be emotionally unaffected or not value his reputation or the
reputation of the person shaming him enough to care about the resulting public
humiliation.65 This uncertainty about how external shaming will be experienced
makes it a particularly unpredictable intervention. Yet, when the motivation is
to punish through diminishing a person’s dignity, interventions designed to
shame may cause more harm than any benefit they might also produce.66 As
argued by Professor Martha Nussbaum, and for reasons explored in the next
Part, for some wrongdoers “[u]sing shame to control crime is . . . like using
gasoline to put out a fire.”67
II.

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND STATESANCTIONED SHAME

Shame has been used as an accountability tool for wrongdoers for centuries.
Yet, within the context of IPV, survivors often bear the brunt of legal and social
63 See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 605 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Criminal
offenses, and the penalties that accompany them, nearly always cause shame and
embarrassment. Indeed, the mere fact of conviction, without which state-sponsored
rehabilitation efforts do not commence, is stigmatic. The fact that a condition causes shame
or embarrassment does not automatically render a condition objectionable; rather, such
feelings generally signal the defendant’s acknowledgment of his wrongdoing.” (citation
omitted)).
64 See Karp, supra note 3, at 288 (“Effective shaming depends upon the stake a person
has in the community. If a person cares nothing about the disapproval of others, shame is a
useless tool. But such a person is extremely rare in society and best classified by a
psychiatric disorder. More common is the person who cares little about the opinion of those
who hold mainstream values. Instead, he or she cares about the opinion of other members
of an oppositional subculture. Shaming remains quite effective, but only with regard to
these subcultural members. The trick is to increase the stake of the offender in the larger
community.”).
65 Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 2190 (“[S]haming, which imposes costs by impugning
one’s reputation, can deter only to the extent that a potential offender values his reputation
in the first place.”).
66 Garvey, supra note 6, at 752 (“[W]hen shame does work, it may ironically push an
offender into greater criminality. Rather than simply shame him, the penalty may
‘stigmatize’ or ‘label’ him a ‘criminal.’ And if an offender comes to identify himself as a
‘criminal,’ the result may be more crime, since crime is what ‘criminals’ do.” (footnote
omitted)); see Leslie Meltzer-Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169,
169 (2011) (providing typology of dignity identified through Supreme Court opinions as
including five related concepts, including “personal integrity as dignity” and “collective
virtue as dignity”).
67 NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 236 (“To expose that person to humiliation may often
shatter the all-too-fragile defenses of the person’s ego. The result might be utter collapse.
Short of that, it is likely to be a sense of great alienation from society and its norms, which
may well lead to great violence if the offender is prone to violence.”).
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blame and stigmatization for their failure to behave in ways expected of a
“victim.” Understanding how survivors have experienced shame provides a
critical framework for crafting a morally consistent and principled response to
the acceptance of shame as an intervention for perpetrators. This Part provides
that framework following a broad overview of state-sanctioned shame in
criminal, civil, and extralegal contexts. It then briefly explores the shaming
experiences of survivors before turning to how shame has been used as an
intervention for perpetrators, both historically and in modern-day.
A.

An Overview of State-Sanctioned Shame
1.

Criminal Contexts

Before the advent of the modern U.S. prison system, public shaming was a
commonly used legal sanction to control undesired social behavior.68 Driven by
the Puritan church’s goal of enforcing standards of acceptable behavior and
other social norms (and by European standards before that), publicly imposed
punishments designed to humiliate or ostracize a wrongdoer were relatively
routine.69 A central goal of Puritan punishments was to create an “unpleasant
emotional experience” for the accused.70 Shaming sentences could range from
consequences as minor as public apologies and repentance to physically harmful
ones, including securement to a pillory and stocks; public whipping; or “hours
on the gallows with a rope around the neck.”71 In response to particularly errant
social transgressions, some individuals were permanently maimed, including
through branding with a letter to serve as an enduring symbol to the community

For further discussion on the history of public shaming, see Mimi E. Kim, Moving
Beyond Critique: Creative Interventions and Reconstructions of Community
Accountability, 37 SOC. JUST. 14, 21 (2011), and Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to
Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1179, 1179-81, 1220-46 (1982).
69 E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1115-16 (3d Cir. 1997) (Becker, J., concurring)
(discussing common shaming punishments among American colonies, such as admonition,
branding, and maiming); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law,
89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1914-15 (1991) (explaining importance in Puritan society of
shaming punishments taking place in public to “reinforce the moral order”).
70 Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1115-16 (describing shaming punishments as effective because
“they had ‘sting’”); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 20
(2004) (describing purpose of Puritan church courts was to “shame and disgrace the
sinner”).
71 Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1115-16 (“[T]he physical punishment was seen as being
effective only insofar as it resulted in the offender being shamed by the publicity of his
offense.”); Massaro, supra note 69, at 1912-15 (describing Puritan punishments, ranging
from public confessions to death).
68
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of the crime committed.72 Non-physical but nonetheless acutely stigmatizing
punishments were also imposed, including orders requiring wrongdoers to hold
signs or wear letters indicating their transgressions.73 The effects of such
punishments were made more intense by their occurrence before the community
where an offender lived, often leading to continued humiliation long after the
sentence had expired.74
Following centuries of use, public shaming as a formal intervention
eventually decreased for two primary reasons. First, available land, economic
opportunity, and an improved transportation infrastructure began to break apart
the close-knit Puritan communities.75 This community disruption reduced the
mark of public wrongdoing and the related sting of isolation and disapproval
that resulted from shaming sentences.76 Second, growing collective moral
outrage about degrading and humiliating forms of punishment led to more
standardized punishments, including banishment from the community.77 As a
result, by the mid-1900s, nearly all forms of physical shaming punishments and
most other forms of public humiliation were replaced by more consistent
sentences intended to remove the wrongdoer from the community and/or limit
his freedom of movement.78 This standardized punishment of community

See Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1115-16 (“The effect of branding, mutilation, or maiming
was often to cast the offender out of society once and for all.”); NUSSBAUM, supra note 3,
at 174 (“The branding of criminals . . . is a practice that keeps reappearing in one or another
form, and thus shame has been throughout history a pervasive part of practices of
punishment.”); Paul Ziel, Eighteenth Century Public Humiliation Penalties in Twenty-First
Century America: The “Shameful” Return of “Scarlet Letter” Punishments in U.S. v.
Gementera, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 499, 500 (2005) (noting that historical practices “involved
branding the criminal on a visible part of the body, such as the cheek or forehead, so as to
unmistakably alert the public to the criminal’s tendencies”).
73 Massaro, supra note 69, at 1912-15.
74 Id. (noting “fear of disgrace before the community was considerable,” especially
given social intimacy of colonies).
75 Ziel, supra note 72, at 502 (noting improvement of transportation infrastructure
resulted in “individuals experienc[ing] unprecedented mobility”).
76 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he foundation enabling the effectiveness of shaming crumbled and
the ideology became archaic.”).
77 Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming
Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1168 (2006) (noting criminal
justice reformers “sought to rid punishment of what they viewed as its undesirable or
ideologically offensive attributes”).
78 Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2167-70
(2001) (“Developed as a partial response to the perceived decline in the utility of shaming
punishments, incarceration of the criminal soon became the dominant penal response.”
(footnote omitted)); Ziel, supra note 72, at 506 (explaining that uniformity was a significant
goal of Congress in setting sentencing guidelines for modern criminal justice system).
72
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removal ultimately led to the development of our modern penitentiary system
and to the dominant carceral response to criminal behavior.79
Yet, following the “extraordinary, quartercentury expansion of American
prisons” and acceptance of punitive consequences as a leading goal of state
intervention, penal and other criminal interventions are increasingly critiqued.80
Among the leading critiques is the dearth of research that supports the
effectiveness of punitive interventions—namely incarceration—in deterring
criminal behavior (including IPV) or rehabilitating offenders (including
perpetrators).81 Another dominant critique of the reliance on jails and prisons
includes the sheer costs of maintaining incarceration, particularly when overall
crime rates have not correspondingly declined.82
In addition to illuminating the challenges with our modern response to crime,
these critiques have been advanced by some to justify reintroducing public
shaming sentences as a legitimate alternative. Some scholars have advocated for
systematically reintroducing shaming sentences as a strategy for fixing our
broken carceral system, viewing shame as a more effective tool for deterrence
and punishment than incarceration.83 Others have argued that shame is a

Markel, supra note 78, at 2170; Ziel, supra note 72, at 501-02.
THE PEW CHARITABLE TR., ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS
2 (2009), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_
web_32609.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ8J-YJWP] (examining effectiveness of America’s
overburdened prison system by noting “we are well past the point of diminishing returns,
where more imprisonment will prevent less and less crime”).
81 See, e.g., Aaron S. Book, Shame on You: An Analysis of Modern Shame Punishment
as an Alternative to Incarceration, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 656 (1999) (noting that
“ample data suggests that current forms of sentencing are ineffective in punishing and/or
rehabilitating criminals”). A dominant critique of the criminal justice system is its disparate
impact on communities of color. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of
Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1274
(2004). However, because the racial disparity critique of the criminal legal system has not
been used to call for increased shaming interventions, it is not directly explored in this
Article.
82 See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1156, 1159 (2015) (“Apart from the inhumanity of incarceration, there is good reason to
doubt the efficacy of incarceration and prison-backed policing as means of managing the
complex social problems they are tasked with addressing, whether interpersonal violence,
addiction, mental illness, or sexual abuse.”); Carol Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and
Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 117 (citing cost of approximately ninety thousand dollars per death row inmate, per
year); THE PEW CHARITABLE TR., supra note 80, at 2 (“[F]or hundreds of thousands of
lower-level inmates, incarceration costs taxpayers far more than it saves in prevented
crime.”).
83 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 153 (noting position of Professor Dan M. Kahan of
Yale Law School that, for variety of offenses, “shame penalties ought to be favored over
other alternatives to imprisonment such as fines and community service”).
79
80

1696

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1677

“common-sense” cost-saving alternative to incarceration.84 Some have
identified that the reduction in shaming penalties has led to high moral costs,
including “adrift” moral compasses of many wrongdoers; shaming penalties,
they argue, are therefore needed to shape the behavior of individual offenders.85
Still others have identified shame as an effective intervention for communities—
through the State—to reassert social control over those prone to criminal
behavior.86 Judges have identified similar rationales for imposing shaming
within their courtrooms. One judge noted that he imposes shaming sentences
because the wrongdoer has “too good a self-esteem.”87 Others have named that
they use shame to rehabilitate or morally educate offenders through the “lessons
learned” from such sentences.88 Still other judges identify shame as mapping
onto the foundational criminal justice tenet of lex talonis—an eye for an eye.89
Ascertaining how frequently courts apply any of these reasonings and impose
shaming sentences in lieu of incarceration or other penalties is difficult. Appeal
rates challenging shaming punishments are low, in large part, because many
wrongdoers consent to the punishment as an alternative to incarceration. Media

In advocating for increased use of shaming and public punishments, one researcher
stated, “Public shaming punishments aren’t just about trying to deter future crimes, or
embarrassing low-level offenders to the extent that they would never think to relapse.
They’re also about the economics of the fiscally broken state and local criminal-justice
system.” Matt Berman, Can Public Shaming Be Good Criminal Punishment?, NAT’L J.
(Sept. 9, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/71318/can-public-shamingbe-good-criminal-punishment [https://perma.cc/WFK6-8TGE].
85 Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 2192.
86 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 227 (referencing Dan Kahan’s idea that punishment
is how “society expresses its most basic values” and shame punishments make “definite
statement”); Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meaning of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
609, 610-12 (2006) (describing benefit of shaming punishments as “adequately
express[ing] the state’s condemnation of the crime at a much lower cost than
imprisonment”); Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 638 (1996) (“[T]he prospect of public disgrace exerts greater pressure to comply with
the law than does the threat of imprisonment and other formal sanctions.”).
87 David Reutter, For Shame! Public Shaming Sentences on the Rise, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/feb/4/shame-publicshaming-sentences-rise/ [https://perma.cc/2ECH-SZ6B] (noting judge would use shameful
punishments to “bring defendants who appeared in his court down a rung”); see Garvey,
supra note 6, at 746-47 (stating shaming punishments fit into retributivist theory that
offender “deserves it”).
88 Garvey, supra note 6, at 757 (noting there are educational aspects of shame
punishments through offenders “having once experienced that unpleasant emotion, fear
experiencing it again and so might refrain from future wrongdoing”); see also Berman,
supra note 84 (describing shame punishments as forcing offender to reflect on their life,
while knowing public is watching, and remembering this while acting in future).
89 Garvey, supra note 6, at 738-39 (stating “[p]unishments should aim to reflect back on
the offender what he has done to his victim”); Reutter, supra note 87; see also Berman,
supra note 84.
84
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typically are not present at what otherwise might appear to be an uneventful
court hearing. Instead, awareness of shaming interventions generally occurs
through the public’s interest in witnessing a public shaming sentence, or from
reports by lawyers or litigants themselves about those experiences. However,
anecdotal evidence suggests that shaming sentences are used with some
consistency in courtrooms across the country. The most ubiquitous examples of
modern shaming in the legal system are of judges ordering persons convicted of
various crimes to hold signs in public locations, naming their crimes90 or
describing themselves as being a particular kind of person (e.g., “stupid,” an
“idiot,” or a “bully”).91 Beyond these more common sentences, judges have also
ordered an offender to watch the autopsy of the person they killed while driving
drunk;92 wear a chicken suit for a solicitation conviction;93 stand with a pig and
a sign reading “This is not a police officer” on a roadside as a consequence for
shouting obscenities at an officer;94 and take out a newspaper advertisement
apologizing for engaging in public sex.95
Each of these sentences has the power to profoundly humiliate the offender,
ostracize him from mainstream society, or both. Yet, judicial intent to humiliate
or ostracize, alone, does not determine the constitutionality of such sentences.
Courts across the United States, including the Supreme Court, have held
shaming sentences to be constitutional so long as they are reasonably related to
a legitimate governmental interest.96 That constitutional threshold is met if the
sentence is consistent with mandated statutory sentencing objectives—most
90 See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004) (ordering defendant,
who was convicted of stealing mail, to hold sign reading “I stole mail. This is my
punishment”); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (ordering defendant
convicted of driving under influence to wear bracelet stating “D.U.I. CONVICT”).
91 See Reutter, supra note 87 (documenting numerous examples of judges sentencing
defendants to hold signs publicly labeling themselves as particular type of person); see also
Ballenger, 436 S.E.2d at 794; Jonathan Turley, Shame on You; Enough with the
Humiliating Punishments, Judges, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2005, at B03 (documenting case
in which judge ordered four young defendants to each wear sign labeling them as
“JUVENILE CRIMINAL”).
92 RONSON, supra note 19, at 82-83.
93 Commit a Crime, Do the Time—in a Chicken Suit, ABC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=3467505&page= 1 [https://perma.cc/5P9U-D9R4]
(documenting case in which judge sentenced defendant to wear bird costume as punishment
for soliciting prostitute).
94 Tracey Read, Most Influential: Judge Michael Cicconetti’s Alternative Sentences
Leave Impression, NEWS-HERALD (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.news-herald.com/generalnews/20121231/most-influential-judge-michael-cicconettis-alternative-sentences-leaveimpression-with-video [https://perma.cc/G43M-QHK4].
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
sentences “must be ‘reasonably related’ to ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant’”).
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commonly deterrence, protection of the public, and offender rehabilitation.97
Nearly all interventions that humiliate or stigmatize the receiver of the sentence
meet those constitutionally mandated constraints.98 However, as explored in
Part III, reliance on constitutionality alone to justify shaming ignores the
extralegal harms that can arise from imposition of such sentences.
2.

Civil and Extralegal Contexts

Public denigration of wrongdoers is also used as a tool for accountability
within civil and extralegal contexts. Most notably, the Internet provides an
informal platform for individuals harmed, including survivors of IPV, to seek
public accountability through public naming of their harmers and the harm they
have experienced.99 Facebook, among other social media sites, has multiple
“naming and shaming” pages devoted to identifying wrongdoers, including
perpetrators of IPV.100 While those forums can provide communal space and
empowerment for victims and their supporters, their use can also lead to
devastating economic, social, and relational consequences on the publicly
“named and shamed” person.101 Unlike legal interventions, which provide
Id. at 607-08.
See id. at 609 (“[W]e are aware of no case holding that contemporary shaming
sanctions violate our Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”).
Cases have been overturned only when interventions have been determined to fail to meet
individual state mandates that limit sentencing statutes to rehabilitation of the offender. See,
e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Ct. App. 1993) (overturning order that
defendant wear t-shirt reading “My record plus two-six packs equal four years” on front
and “I am on felony probation for theft” on back everytime defendant was outside his home,
finding that such order did not serve rehabilitative purpose of California’s probation statute
because order’s “true intent was to brand Hackler and expose him to public ridicule and
humiliation, rather than to facilitate his rehabilitation” and it “severely compromised
Hackler’s chances of finding employment”); People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (overturning order that drunk driving offender publish newspaper
advertisement with apology and mug shot, finding that such order did not comport with
“overall intent” of Illinois’s criminal supervision statute to “aid the defendant in
rehabilitation and in avoiding future violations”).
99 See infra Section II.C (discussing modern day shaming). For a discussion about
internet shaming, see podcast Invisibilia: The Callout, NPR (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/13/601971617/the-callout [https://perma.cc/2ATK-MMKA]
(chronicling woman’s experience “calling out” harassment online and then becoming target
of “callout” for her own past behavior).
100 See generally RONSON, supra note 19 (describing devastating experiences of multiple
individuals who have been “internet shamed”).
101 See, e.g., Domestic Violence Name and Shame, FACEBOOK, https://www.face
book.com/groups/279259069117028/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (containing seven
members and most recent post in 2016); Domestic Violence Name and Shame the Culprits,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/groups/296609539304/?ref= br_rs (last visited
Nov. 20, 2018) (containing three members and most recent post in 2010); Domestic
Violence Perth Name and Shame So They Can’t Do It To Others, FACEBOOK,
97
98
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theoretical checks on orders through appellate review or judicial oversight,
Internet shaming has no such safeguards.
Within a civil context, “Megan’s Laws” authorize publication of the names
and addresses of persons convicted of certain crimes in sex offender
registries.102 The reach of the Internet has had a profound impact on the shaming
aspect of this form of state intervention. By way of example, in 2017, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a Megan’s Law registry requirement
could not be imposed ex post facto in part because it found the law’s
“publication provisions—when viewed in the context of our current internetbased world—to be comparable to shaming punishments.”103 This ruling is one
of the first to find that the potential harm of disseminating “public” information
in light of the Internet’s expanse outweighs the defined governmental interest.104
Contrasted with Pennsylvania’s ruling, the reach of the Internet, and the
intensity and scope of public humiliation it allows, has been used to support the
publication of information about parents delinquent in child support. In 2016,
the Arizona Department of Economic Security began tweeting out photos,
names, and how much parents—predominantly fathers—owe in child support,
followed by the hashtag “#deadbeats.”105 While posting the names and photos
https://www.facebook.com/groups/315597552204075/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018)
(containing eight members and requires permission to join); Enoughs Enough!! Domestic
Violence Against Women . . . Name n Shame, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
groups/969707293056176/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (containing 553 members and
requires permission to join); NAME AND SHAME – Domestic Violence, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/groups/154178297949000/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018)
(containing three members and most recent post in 2011); Name and Shame the People
That Do Domestic Violence to Others, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/groups/
140891946026652/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (containing seven members and most
recent post in 2012); Naming and Shaming Domestic Violence Offenders, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/groups/280090482129809/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018)
(containing twenty-six members and most recent post in 2014); Stop Domestic Violence
Lets Start Naming and Shaming Abusers, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
groups/74560270714/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (containing four members and most
recent post in 2011).
102 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.46 (West 2018) (requiring publication on internet
of dates of conviction and incarceration of sex offenders in California).
103 Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1212 (Pa. 2017) (finding that
Pennsylvania registry is primarily punishment).
104 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 86 (2003) (ruling that posting and public
notification of person under Alaska’s sex offender registration statute is not shaming
because it results from “dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record,
most of which is already public”); Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 2196 (noting how complexity
of modern society limits impact of most shaming penalties as being only “partially
communicative,” as most members of offender’s community will not learn about
imposition of shaming penalties).
105 Gregory Krieg, How to Make ‘Deadbeat Dads’ Pay in 140 Characters or Less, CNN
(last updated Jan. 12, 2016, 4:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/12/politics/deadbeat-
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of parents delinquent in child support on state websites is common across the
United States, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey turned to Twitter after deciding
that simply naming on the state website was not stigmatizing enough.106 In a
press conference directed at non-compliant fathers, Governor Ducey stated:
For too long, you’ve been able to remain anonymous, able to skirt your
financial and legal responsibilities with no shame . . . . Well here’s a new one
for all the deadbeat dads out there: effective immediately, the state is going
to begin posting the photos, names, and money owed by these losers to social
media, with the hashtag deadbeat. . . . If you don’t want your embarrassing,
unlawful, and irresponsible behavior going viral: man up and pay up.107
Despite identified justifications of public safety and accountability for these
and other public interventions, publicizing a person’s wrongdoing has
exceedingly mixed results. In most contexts, experiencing shame has “no record
of efficacy in turning someone away from crime” and research suggests limited
effectiveness in stigmatizing interventions leading to other positive behavior
change.108 While some offenders identified that the Megan’s Law registration
requirement created a motivation not to re-offend, others identified that they
suffered from “stress, isolation, loss of relationships, fear, shame,
embarrassment, and hopelessness” as a result of the registration requirements.109
Public shaming may not only be ineffective in stopping perceived morally
contrary behavior but as explored in Part III, may counterproductively increase
the behaviors it is targeted to reduce. 110
The acceptance of shame in legal and extralegal contexts suggests an
additional, more sinister aspect to the appeal of shaming: human interest in the
suffering of others.111 People who are publicly shamed have engaged in an act
dad-tweets-arizona/ index.html [https://perma.cc/7FSR-SC6S] (describing Arizona’s new
policy).
106 Id. Twitter has over 330 million active monthly users. Number of Monthly Active
Twitter Users Worldwide from 1st Quarter 2010 to 2nd Quarter 2018 (in Millions),
STATISTA (2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/ number-of-monthly-activetwitter-users/ [https://perma.cc/TBZ9-D3YS] (showing that Twitter had 335 million active
users in Q2 2018).
107 Arizona State of the State Address, C-SPAN (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/
video/?402989-1/arizona-state-state-address [https://perma.cc/3ZT3-HW29] (containing
quoted language at 34:06).
108 See WALKER, supra note 16, at 47 (“While it is probable that people generally behave
well, both to avoid shame and because they have internalized the social values policed by
shame, there is limited evidence that those who experience shame behave better as a
consequence.”); Berman, supra note 84 (“[P]ublic shaming has no record of efficacy in
turning someone away from crime . . . .”).
109 Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender
Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 49 (2005) (detailing study of 183 men who
were subject to notification requirements as result of sex offense convictions).
110 See infra Section III.C (discussing intersection of poverty and IPV perpetration).
111 There is research to suggest that interest in the suffering of others is biologically
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considered amoral or offensive to the senses of a broad subgroup of citizens. As
was true in Colonial America, modern public shaming provides collective
communal judgment about unacceptable behavior. That judgment arises from a
sense of power and entitlement by certain (usually self-selected) subsections of
the population to correct the behavior of others, particularly certain kinds of
wrongdoers—those assumed to have an inherent proclivity for deviant behavior
(e.g., sexual “predators,” fathers who are not financially responsible for their
children, drunk drivers). Shaming or taking pleasure in the shaming of others
provides moral validation to the life one is living as compared to their “amoral”
counterparts,112 resting on an assumption that one’s own behavior would not
transgress into the moral failings displayed by the shamed individual.113 Within
the context of IPV specifically, the dominant cultural narrative attached to
perpetrators—like “deadbeats” and “bullies”—easily casts them within a group
of individuals for whom shaming sanctions may be particularly easy to tolerate,
accept, and even take pleasure in.
B.

Survivors, Blame, and IPV

Consistent with its determination to institutionalize and control social
behavior, the Puritan church also led efforts to reduce violence in the homes of
European descendants.114 The Puritans enacted the first laws against family
violence, including spousal abuse, in the Western world.115 Puritan leaders were
responsible for adjudicating cases involving family violence, often ordering
public accountability for husbands who privately harmed their children or
wives.116 While laws demanding accountability for the violence husbands
inflicted on their wives demonstrated movement towards recognizing spousal
abuse as a social wrong, religious and cultural expectations of both men and
women carved deep exceptions to what constituted amoral behavior. If a woman
rooted. See, e.g., Mina Cikara & Susan T. Fiske, Their Pain, Our Pleasure: Stereotype
Content and Schadenfreude, 1299 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 52, 53 (2013) (finding through
controlled experiments that envy is strongly correlated with schadenfreude). Pleasure felt
in response to someone else’s misfortune is captured in the phrase “schadenfreude.” See,
e.g., Richard H. Smith et al., Exploring the When and Why of Schadenfreude, 3/4 SOC. &
PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 530, 530 (2009) (defining schadenfreude).
112 Talk of the Nation: Why We Revel in Others’ Humiliation, NPR (Aug. 1, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/2011/08/01/138895817/why-we-revel-in-others-humiliation [https://
perma.cc/F69D-NRCF].
113 See, e.g., RONSON, supra note 19, at 33-66 (describing intense public shaming against
journalist who plagiarized aspects of book).
114 PLECK, supra note 70, at 20 (“Church courts tried cases of spouse abuse, cruelty to
children and servants, assaults, threats against parents, and child neglect . . . .”).
115 Id. at 21 (noting that “Massachusetts Body of Liberties” provided that “Everie
marryed woeman shall be free from bodilie correction or stripes by her husband”).
116 Id. at 20 (noting that “ruling church elders investigated complaints” and upon
congregation’s determination that accused was guilty and had failed to repent, minister
would deliver “blistering sermon chastising the evildoer”).
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deviated from her expected role as wife and homemaker, or was perceived to do
so, both she and her husband could be publicly shamed—she, for her deviation,
and he, for failing to keep her in line.117 These exceptions created implicit and
explicit permission—even social and legal expectations—for domestic violence
(“DV”). A “nagging wife” and a “woman who convenanted with the devil” were
separated by a “thin line,” with both serving as a justification for DV and public
humiliation.118 Indeed, because “nagging” and adultering wives were so often
blamed for bringing violence upon themselves, women began identifying in
their petitions for divorce that they were beaten “without provocation.”119 These
experiences of Puritan women were the experiences of white women. There was
little to no accountability—through the Church or otherwise—for women held
as slaves or who fell outside of the Puritan community and experienced violence
in their intimate relationships during this period, or for many of the decades that
followed.120
Through the late-1900s, progress towards perpetrator accountability was slow
but incremental. By the mid-1800s, states began to criminalize DV, with some
sanctioning public physical punishments as an accountability tool.121 A few
states passed laws that authorized physical and public shaming through flogging
as a formal legal intervention for violence perpetrated in the home, though even
those laws were limited to “extreme cases of wife beating.”122 Other states
authorized less brutal but equally public forms of punishments. For example, in
1877 the Nevada legislature passed a law to “tie for two to ten hours, to a
permanent post erected in the county seat, any man convicted for the first time
of beating his wife or another woman.”123 The offender was forced “to wear a
sign that read, ‘Woman or wife beater.’”124
Despite some attempts to legislate accountability for DV by humiliating
perpetrators, wives continued to be routinely blamed and shamed for “causing”
Common law principles of coverture granted husbands the right to beat their wives
and impose public punishments for “misbehaving.” See Miccio, supra note 46, at 287 (“The
liberty to beat wives, a liberty the common law granted husbands through the doctrine of
coverture . . . .”); Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Stereotyped Offender: Domestic Violence and
the Failure of Intervention, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 337, 350 (2015) (noting that colonial
courts “often found fault with the behavior of both spouses”).
118 PLECK, supra note 70, at 18-19 (providing examples of wives being publicly
humiliated).
119 Id. at 24.
120 See generally Terri L. Snyder, Women, Race and the Law in Early America, in
OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIAS (Sept. 2015).
121 PLECK, supra note 70, at 109.
122 Id. at 111. While the motivation for those laws may have been to regulate abuse in
intimate relationships, history suggests that the law was motivated more by a desire to
“control the lower classes.” Id. at 109.
123 Id. at 110.
124 Id.
117
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the violence against them on a much grander scale than men were for inflicting
it. By way of example, in 1864, a North Carolina court determined that an
accusation of adultery charged by the wife against her husband was “sufficient
provocation to justify a physical attack because her behavior fell outside the
bounds of acceptable wifely conduct.”125 Thus, despite some legal progress,
most perpetrators still were not held accountable as the legal system continued
to rationalize blaming survivors and to shift responsibility from the person
inflicting abuse to the person experiencing it.126
The eventual dismantling of laws favoring public chastisement and coverture
nearly eliminated the risk that abused women would be subjected to formal,
public punishments by the State for their “role” in the violence inflicted upon
them.127 Divorce became more accepted in the late 19th century, providing some
women increased opportunities to exit abusive relationships.128 However,
progress remained elusive as existing chastisement laws were substituted with
laws that legitimatized DV through a different justification: family privacy and
spousal immunity.129 Once again, these laws left perpetrators unaccountable and
women with limited recourse for the violence inflicted upon them.130
Through vigorous advocacy by feminists, survivors, and other anti-IPV
advocates, including the intentional naming of the scope and depth of the
problem of violence against women, the last fifty years have led to a profound
shift from complacency and overt victim blaming to demands for state and
perpetrator accountability. By the late 1980s, family privacy and spousal
immunity laws were repealed, reducing legal protections for perpetrators of
abuse. Additionally, many anti-IPV advocates urged stronger criminal
interventions “in part as a corrective for the history of profoundly inadequate
and sometimes hostile response of the criminal justice system to domestic
violence cases.”131 As a result, today many jurisdictions have adopted
Miccio, supra note 46, at 253 (citing State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262 (1864)).
But see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention in the
American West and Australia, 1860-1930, 86 IND. L.J. 185 (2011) (challenging scholarship
alleging apathy towards DV during this time).
127 See Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to
Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1850 (2001).
128 Ramsey, supra note 126, at 195 (documenting expanding grounds for divorce in
United States and Australia in 19th century to include reasons such as “mental cruelty,”
adultery, and physical abuse).
129
LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 29-30
(2008) (“[C]ourts adopted a family privacy theory: The legal system should avoid
intervention in domestic violence cases out of a respect for the sanctity of the family and
the intimacy of family relationships.”).
130 Id. at 30 (“If the courts refused to get involved, husbands could still beat their wives
with little fear of state intervention of punishment.”).
131 Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law:
A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 803 (2001) (describing changes in criminal
125
126
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mandatory policies, including mandatory arrests and “no-drop” prosecutions in
an explicit attempt to increase the accountability that for centuries had been
elusive.132 CPOs, available in every state, provide opportunities for survivors to
create complementary forms of accountability through treatment programs,
classes, or other requirements ordered of their abusing partners.
Despite progress towards increasing legal accountability, entrenched ideas
about survivor behavior linger, contributing to less formal, though equally
insidious, blaming and shaming of survivors.133 Just as survivors report shame
as an outcome of IPV and its correlative trauma, they also report experiencing
shame from the system actors upon whom they must rely to extricate themselves
from abusive relationships.134 Survivors are routinely demeaned and disbelieved

law for IPV).
132 The dominant use of the criminal justice system, its mandatory policies and
punishment, has generated robust critique by feminists and advocates, in large part about
the impact such policies have on survivors. See, e.g., LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 107 (2012) (“Mandatory arrest
brought greater protection for many women, but at a sizeable cost—the freedom of
individual women to decide whether they wanted to be involved in the criminal system at
all.”); Coker, supra note 131, at 806 (“[B]ecause these policies make irrelevant battered
women’s preferences regarding arrest and prosecution, mandatory policies limit the control
of individual women.”); Epstein, supra note 127, at 1867 (“By failing to honor a victim’s
individual preferences, mandatory policies patronize her and may undermine her efforts to
exert control over her life by disrupting her intimate relationship, economic security, and
family stability.”); Deborah Epstein, Margret E. Bell & Lisa A. Goodman, Transforming
Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 467
(2003) (“For many battered women, prosecution of their batterers actually creates a greater
long-term risk of harm.”); Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course in the Anti-Domestic
Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV. 145, 148 (2015) (“It
is time for the anti-domestic violence movement to consider taking a critical look at the
state and institutional response to domestic violence and the current goal of safety, asking
whether each established response or new initiative is addressing the needs of persons
subjected to abuse in terms of their personal goals, resilience, agency, and dignity.”).
133 See Nicole M. Overstreet & Diane M. Quinn, The Intimate Partner Violence
Stigmatization Model and Barriers to Help Seeking, 35 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
109, 118 (2013) (analyzing existence of “cultural stigma” which is “manifested as victimblaming reactions and attitudes from formal and informal support networks”).
134 See, e.g., Herman, supra note 8, at 573 (indicating that victims understand legal
system as “theater of shame”); Overstreet & Quinn, supra note 133, at 117 (noting that
results of eleven studies showed women “expressed self-blame, shame, and embarrassment
about partner abuse”).
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by police,135 courts,136 and other system actors for not conforming to
expectations of how a survivor “should” respond to abuse, regardless of whether
those responses would make her safe or stable. Women describe not reporting,
or underreporting, their experiences with IPV or sexual violence “because they
feel ashamed and responsible for the violence; they fear family disintegration,
physical reprisal, and being degraded in the courtroom.”137 Survivors also
identify embarrassment or fear of not being believed as weighing on their

135 In a recent ACLU large-scale study of service providers, attorneys, and others
working with survivors of IPV, nearly eighty-eight percent reported that the police
“sometimes” or “often” do not believe survivors or blame survivors for the violence and
eighty-three percent reported that the police “sometimes” or “often” failed to take
allegations of sexual assault and domestic violence seriously. ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE
FIELD: SEXUAL ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND POLICING 1 (2015), https://www.aclu.
org/report/sexual-assault-domestic-violence-and-policing [https://perma.cc/F97N-RRC6]
(explaining concerns with regard to how police respond to domestic violence and sexual
assault according to study respondents).
136 See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 751 (2007)
(explaining how legal system’s response to domestic violence victims reveals belief that
women victims are weak and do not act in their best interests, particularly if they choose to
stay with their abuser).
137 John Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian
Control, in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN: FEMINIST IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY 151, 163 (Susan L. Miller ed., 1998). Two recent examples validate these concerns.
In December 2011, a woman came before a judge in Baltimore County, Maryland, for a
temporary order of protection. Judge Bruce Lamdin Interrogates Woman Seeking
Restraining Order, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/
opinions/judge-bruce-lamdin-interrogates-woman-seeking-restraining-order/2012/09/09/
614fd664-faae-11e1-875c-4c21cd68f653_video.html?utm_term=.36f6c6fbb22a\. In her ex
parte testimony, the petitioner described a horrific assault by her husband:
He pinned me to a shelf, busted my arm open, left a gash in my forearm. He then threw
me down on the floor, stomped me in the ribs so hard that I peed my pants. My oldest
who was 12 years old got my son and hid in a closet with a hammer and called
someone to come get us.
Id. The woman further described her husband’s attempt to burn down their house a few
days after the violence. Id. When she argued that she believed he was a threat to her safety
and welfare and asked the judge to remove him from their shared home, the judge
responded, “Ma’am there are shelters” and “It confounds me that people tell me they are
scared for their life and then they stay in a situation where they can remove themselves and
go to a shelter.” Id. In 2014, a survivor of abuse had been subpoenaed to court for the trial
of the person who had abused her. Rene Stutzman, Seminole County Judge Reprimanded
by Florida Supreme Court, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 31, 2016, at B4. She failed to appear
and a warrant for her arrest was issued. Id. After being arrested for her failure to appear,
Florida Judge Jerri Collins brought the woman to tears. Id. After she identified extreme
anxiety and her desire not to be involved in the trial as her reason for not appearing, Judge
Collins responded, “You think you’re going to have anxiety now? You haven’t even seen
anxiety.” Id. Finding the woman in contempt, she sentenced her to three days in the county
jail. Id. Both judges were ultimately sanctioned for their behavior in these cases. Id.
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decision-making about how to respond to the violence they have experienced.138
As observed by Judith Herman, “Victims understand only too well that what
awaits them in the legal system is a theater of shame.”139 The myriad ways
survivors continue to be blamed for the abuse inflicted upon them and their
responses to it has driven much of the dominant feminist critiques of the
mandatory policies rooted in our modern legal responses to IPV.140 The criminal
system specifically has been critiqued for the ways it can be disempowering,
traumatizing, or humiliating in a manner “reminiscent of the original crime,”
and even “diametrically opposed” to the goals of survivors.141 While the civil
system provides more control to survivors, survivors have identified “feeling
powerless and marginalized in the face of the complex rules and procedures” of
the civil process.142
Unlike the motivations that may drive shaming those who perpetrate abuse
(as described elsewhere in this Article), blaming and shaming survivors is often
motivated by gender-normative expectations about how a victim “should”
behave.143 Despite these different motivations, there are parallels in outcome:
shaming survivors or perpetrators for their response to an experience can result
in acute dignity deprivation, with the shamed person being able to only “present
himself [or herself] as part of his [or her] full self, rather than a unified,
composed, or collected whole.”144 Drawing from these experiences of survivors
can help shape a broad, morally consistent, and dignity-driven approach to the
legal system’s treatment of individuals who engage in IPV. A commitment to
dignity cannot be limited to those who are legally or socially sympathetic or
blameless, but must include protecting the inherent value of all citizen, including
those who engage in deviant behavior. As explored in Part III, the distinction
between “survivor” and “perpetrator” is often a illusory one. As a result, while
the “justice system’s treatment of victims has been far worse than its treatment
of their abusive partners, the perceptions and experiences of” individuals who

138 ACLU, supra note 135, at 7-8 (“Other studies find that the primary reasons for nonreporting were embarrassment, fear of reprisal, fear that police won’t believe them, and
belief that police are likely to be ineffective.”).
139 Herman, supra note 8, at 573.
140 See, e.g., Coker, supra note 131, at 801 (analyzing impact of mandatory arrest
policies on victims of domestic violence); Gruber, supra note 136, at 757-61 (considering
advantages and disadvantages of mandatory arrest policies).
141 Herman, supra note 8, at 574, 582.
142 Id. at 582 (explaining that despite power legal system offers complainants, victims
often feel powerless due to emotional nature of situation and confusing intricacies of filing
civil complaint).
143 See, e.g., Overstreet & Quinn, supra note 133, at 118 (explaining how “friends and
family made IPV survivors feel ‘stupid’ for staying in an abusive relationship”).
144 Meltzer-Henry, supra note 66, at 219 (using Supreme Court opinions to explain
personal integrity as dignity).
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abuse must be considered in order to protect the legitimacy of the legal system
and to craft accountability interventions that prioritize dignity for all.145
C.

Perpetrator Accountability and Modern-Day Shaming
1.

Accountability, Defined

Following centuries of legal and social complacency, perpetrator
accountability, along with survivor safety, is now consistently identified as a
dominant goal of the anti-IPV movement.146 Accountability occurs through two
distinct but interrelated means: those externally imposed and those that result
from an internal recognition of a wrong done and the learning that flows from
that recognition.147 External accountability “occurs when you change your
behavior because another person or an outside agency gives you consequences
for your behavior.”148 External accountability might occur through a public
declaration or public action that a person or organization has complied with
norms or expectations, or failed to comply, followed by a reinforcer or punisher.
Voters hold public officials externally accountable for their election promises,
reelecting them into office or voting them out depending on their perceived
effectiveness. Schools are held externally accountable for their students’ tests
scores, which can impact bonuses, enrollment numbers, and teacher recruitment.
Within the context of IPV, external accountability can be achieved through
public, judicial, and/or moral condemnation by others of a perpetrator’s
abuse.149 External accountability in the context of wrongdoing might occur
through retributive interventions, such as arrests, convictions, and CPOs (though
not technically retributive, CPOs are often pursued to redress harm
experienced).
Epstein, supra note 127, at 1884.
See Ramsey, supra note 117, at 359 (“[T]he Battered Woman’s Movement
emphasized batterer accountability, rather than treatment. Keeping women safe and helping
them escape abusive relationships, along with educating the public about the harms of
domestic violence, also headed the Movement’s goals.”). Some feminist scholars question
whether these two goals should be expanded to include others. See, e.g., Johnson, supra
note 132, at 148 (arguing that anti-DV movement needs to shift from goal of “short-term
safety” to “short and long-term security”).
147 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 16, at 132 (noting that shame “is internally felt but
also externally imposed”).
148 See, e.g., KEVIN A. FALL & SHAREEN HOWARD, ALTERNATIVES TO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A HOMEWORK MANUAL FOR BATTERING INTERVENTION GROUPS 105-06 (4th ed.
2017).
149 According to John Braithwaite, shaming is “all social processes of expressing
disapproval which have the intention or effect of invoking remorse in the person being
shamed and/or condemnation by others who become aware of the shaming.” BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 29, at 100. Braithwaite’s definition “does not limit itself to demeaning or
humiliating forms of disapproval but seeks to encompass the full spectrum of ways in which
disapproval might be expressed.” Harris, supra note 28, at 4810.
145
146
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Holding perpetrators externally accountable can be critical to the
empowerment and overarching goals of a survivor—convictions, treatment
programs, and stay away orders carry an explicit message that abuse is not
tolerated, can validate a survivor’s experience, and ultimately, may keep her
safe.150 Yet, as Fernando Mederos noted, “creative and flexible” responses to
perpetrator accountability advocated through the initial anti-IPV movement
have moved to “somewhat rigid beliefs and practices about intervention” for
perpetrators.151 In particular, and as explored further below, accepted external
accountability interventions for IPV have been intransigently stuck on a
standardized menu of interventions including criminal convictions and
domestive violence intervention programs (“DVIPs”), with limited space for
interventions that are responsive to the experiences or needs of the individual
perpetrator.
Internal accountability is most commonly identified as rehabilitation—a
cognitive recognition of the harm one has caused followed by a change of
behavior.152 The strongest indicator of internal accountability is avoidance of
deviant behaviors and engagement in adaptive ones.153 Understanding how to
achieve internal accountability and what factors might interfere with it is critical
to understanding how to most effectively intervene in response to harmful
behaviors.154
External and internal accountability are interrelated. External accountability
can increase one’s internal accountability by creating a climate where
expectations for behavior are clear and the expected behavior change is
perceived as possible. To achieve internal accountability, a contemporaneous
external force, such as a conviction, CPO or a restorative justice conference,
may be necessary. Conversely, if external interventions fail to resonate with the
wrongdoer, or if they ostracize or denigrate him, internal recognition of
wrongdoing and behavior modification may be elusive. While shame can be a
vehicle for achieving internal accountability, neither internal nor external
150 See, e.g., Herman, supra note 8, at 585 (explaining that victims’ “most important
object was to gain validation from the community” and that “[t]hey wanted their
communities to take a clear and unequivocal stand in condemnation of the offense”).
151 Fernando Mederos, Batterer Intervention Programs: The Past, and Future
Prospects, in COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS
FROM DULUTH AND BEYOND 127, 135 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen Pence eds., 1999).
152 FALL & HOWARD, supra note 148, at 105-06.
153 See, e.g., id. (“Internal accountability occurs when you change your behavior
because you believe it is the right thing to do. Deep inside, you realize that you are
responsible for hurting another person, and for that reason you want to change.”).
154 CREATIVE INTERVENTIONS, CREATIVE INTERVENTIONS TOOLKIT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO STOP INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 4.F-1 to 4.F-93 (2012), http://www.creativeinterventions.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/4.F.CI-Toolkit-Tools-Taking-Accountabili
ty-Pre-Release-Version-06.2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W4YP-VJHY]
(suggesting
strategies to anticipate resistance to taking accountability and navigate such avoidance
tactics in order to achieve accountability and stop violence).
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accountability need shame to be achieved. In fact, shaming may reduce internal
accountability by a person emotionally or physically blocking himself from
shame’s potentially positive impact.155 Yet, within our legal system and
increasingly within our culture, shame is conflated with accountability, the
distinctions between them ignored.
2.

Shaming Sentences

In 2013, a twenty-seven-year-old man punched his girlfriend in the face,
fracturing it in three places.156 After convicting him, a Montana district judge
ordered the defendant, in addition to sentencing him to six months in jail and
ordering him to pay the medical bills his girlfriend incurred as a result of the
assault, to write “boys do not hit girls” five thousand times.157 In Florida, a wife
alleged that her husband pushed her onto their couch and “put his hand on her
neck.”158 Upon finding that the violence was “very, very minor,” and after
hearing from the wife that she was not hurt or in fear, the court ordered the
husband to buy his wife flowers, bring her to Red Lobster for dinner, and then
take her bowling.159 In 2004, a judge in Texas ordered a perpetrator of abuse to
attend yoga classes once a week for a year.160
Depending on the perpetrator, these sentences may achieve the goal of
internal accountability by rehabilitating him through recognition of the harm he
caused, while also validating the survivor’s experience and maintaining the
retributive focus of the criminal legal system. These sentences may be viewed
as creative, even constructive, and neither designed to publicly denigrate the
perpetrator, nor out of line with the severity of the underlying crime. Indeed,
creative sentences can lead to targeted problem-solving and provide judges the
ability to identify the most directed interventions for an individual’s harmful
behavior.161 Sentences that expand beyond traditional criminal justice
See supra Part I (analyzing unpredicatable nature of responses to shaming tactics).
Michael Muskal, Judge Orders Man to Write 5,000 Sentences; Man Who Punched
Girlfriend Must Draft ‘Boys Do Not Hit Girls.’, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 25, 2013, at
A6.
157 Id.
158 Danielle A. Alvarez, Judge Orders Husband in Marital Spat: Go on a Nice Date,
SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 2012, at 1A. The judge also found that the defendant held up his fist
to hit her but never struck her. Id.
159
Id. The couple was also ordered to begin seeing a marriage counselor within a week.
Id.
160 Yoga Sentence Judge: ‘Each Case is Different’, CNN (Jan. 24, 2004, 9:18 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/24/cnna.standley/ [https://perma.cc/62P3-G96P]. This
condition was ordered with the support of the victim and in addition to ten to twelve months
of probation, eighty hours of community service, anger management counseling, and
random urinalysis. Id.
161 See, e.g., Commit a Crime, Do the Time—in a Chicken Suit, supra note 93 (exploring
judge’s use of creative punishments when he found “traditional sentences, the jail time and
155
156
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interventions can be more effective than those that fit within the standardized
consequences routinely imposed.162
However, creative sentences should be imposed with caution. Judges have
expansive power to issue orders that cross into shaming a litigant under a pretext
of “fairness” or “creativity.”163 As explored in this Article, how a sentence will
be experienced depends in large part on the person against whom it is ordered.
For some, attending a yoga class for a year may be an educational and
transformative experience; for others, it may feel akin to wearing a sign on their
back. As such, judges must carefully weigh whether the gain in imposing a
creative sentence outweighs the risks to the individual against whom the order
is issued and, for the reasons explored herein, the survivor of that person’s
abuse.
Shame is a more obvious motivation for other types of sentences ordered in
IPV cases. In one case, a judge ordered a convicted perpetrator of IPV to stand
in front of his ex-wife—his victim—while she spit in his face.164 As noted in the
Introduction, in March 2017, a judge in Guilford County, North Carolina
ordered three men found guilty of misdemeanor domestic violence charges the
option of carrying a sign or serving time in jail.165 All three men chose to carry
the sign, which read: “This is the face of domestic abuse.”166 When asked about
the experience, one of the men identified that carrying his sign was “pure hell,
it’s embarrassment.”167
These sanctions may have satisfied the judge, the community, and even the
survivor that the perpetrator was being held externally accountable for his crime.
However, such sentences risk counterproductive outcomes to survivor safety
and to a perpetrator’s ability to achieve internal accountability. Shaming
sentences also have an ancillary risk: While the shaming orders noted above
were directed at particular wrongdoers, the reach of those sentences may extend
well beyond the targeted person to his partner, children, and broader social
network.168 Indeed, family members and friends of wrongdoers often report
a fine—those weren’t working”).
162 See, e.g., id. (“While there’s no hard evidence that these punishments actually reduce
crime, many are designed to give back to society or the person wronged.”).
163 See, e.g., id. (“Many defendants complain the creativity is merely grandstanding or
abuse of power, and some lawyers question its overall impact, saying these types of ‘scarlet
letter’ sentences have no place in modern society.”).
164 Karp, supra note 56, at 303-04 (providing examples of “debasement penalties”
which are designed to “lower the status of the offender through humiliation”).
165 Chad Tucker, Guilford County Judge Orders Public Humiliation Punishment for
Domestic Abusers, FOX 8 (Mar. 29, 2017, 4:03 PM), http://myfox8.com/2017/03/29/guil
ford-county-judge-orders-public-humiliation-punishment-for-domestic-abusers/
[https://perma.cc/Z3CS-27NR] (describing men’s reactions to their sentences).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Hedwig Lee, Lauren C. Porter & Megan Comfort, Consequences of Family Member
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shame through association, which can lead to the associated person’s own
stigmatization.169 Shame by association may be particularly damaging to
survivors of IPV, many of whom choose to stay with their shamed partner, and
may contribute to the culture of survivor blame so prevalent within our modern,
socio-legal systems.
Finally, formal shaming sentences can have a broadly destructive impact
beyond the individual shamed. As Professor Leslie Meltzer-Henry argued,
“When society treats people in ways that are in-humane, or when people engage
in activities that are de-humanizing, collective virtue as dignity diminishes.”170
State-sanctioned degradation or humiliation of a person “is wrong not only for
the effect it has on that individual, but also for the consequences it has on
collective humanity and society.”171 If the goal of the above-identified shaming
orders was to send a message of moral condemnation for shameful behavior, the
judge incongruously subverted the dignity of the defendant to do so, potentially
decreasing societal expectations of the judiciary. If the goal was to display unity
with the survivor, the court may have failed not only by increasing her risk of
physical harm, but by embarrassing the person she ultimately may love.172 If the
goal was to educate the offender or others about the harm of the shameful act of
IPV, the lesson learned may be broader distrust of the legal system and lack of
clarity on the harms of shaming.
3.

Domestic Violence Intervention Programs

DVIPs are the most commonly utilized intervention in civil and criminal
cases involving IPV.173 Though they “vary considerably in format, duration,
Incarceration: Impacts on Civil Participation and Perceptions of the Legitimacy and
Fairness of Government, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 44, 46 (2015) (noting that
friends and family members of incarcerated persons may experience “feelings of shame
and stigmatization” as result of that person’s incarceration).
169 See, e.g., GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 30 (explaining “tendency for a stigma to spread
from the stigmatized individual to his close connections”).
170 Meltzer-Henry, supra note 66, at 221.
171 See id. (explaining consequences of treating people in “subhuman manner”).
172 See Tamara L. Kuennen, Love Matters, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 990-91 (2014) (noting
that women who remain in abusive relationships often feel “deep sense of commitment to
their partners” and “feel hope that their relationships can work out”).
173 Mandatory DVIP attendance was reported as a primary intervention to domestic
violence intervention in thirty-four percent of courts that responded to a national survey,
with between seventy-five percent to one hundred percent of offenders ordered into a
batterer program. MELISSA LABRIOLA ET AL., A NATIONAL PORTRAIT OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COURTS, at vii (2009); see CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE ON LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: KEEPING THE PROMISE, VICTIM
SAFETY AND BATTERER ACCOUNTABILITY 5 (2005) (“Batterer intervention programs are at
the center of California’s criminal justice response to domestic violence. Most convicted
batterers are sentenced to probation and required, as part of that sentence, to complete a 52week program.”); Ellen L. Pence & Melanie F. Shepard, An Introduction: Developing a
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approach, and collaborations,”174 the vast majority of DVIPs conform to the
Duluth Model.175 The Duluth Model arose out of feminist theory recognizing
that IPV is caused by “patriarchal beliefs that compel men to exert power and
control over their female partners through psychological and physical abuse.”176
Within this framework, men—DVIP programs are nearly uniformly designed
for heterosexual male perpetrators of abuse—are asked to confront their
attitudes about control and to learn strategies for dealing nonviolently with
intimate partners.177 DVIPs work in tandem with the legal system by holding
perpetrators externally accountable to the victim, the court, and the
community.178 DVIPs also are designed to teach perpetrators to modify their
cognitive justifications (and ultimately their behavior) for their abuse.179 In
some U.S. courtrooms, nearly one hundred percent of identified perpetrators are
referred to DVIPs.180
Despite how commonly courts order participation in DVIPs, “[m]ost findings
show that these programs do not change [perpetrators’] attitudes toward women
Coordinated Community Response, in COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM DULUTH AND BEYOND, supra 151, at 3, 3-4
(explaining origin and growth of Duluth Model as intervention program).
174 EDWARD W. GONDOLF, THE FUTURE OF BATTERER PROGRAMS: REASSESSING
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE 13 (2012). Programs range from twelve to fifty-two weeks
long. See Julia C. Babcock, Charles E. Green & Chet Robie, Does Batterers’ Treatment
Work? A Meta-Analytic Review of Domestic Violence Treatment, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
REV. 1023, 1024 (2004) (finding that treatment effects from IPV programs, including those
that use cognitive behavioral therapy (“CBT”) and Duluth Models had “minimal impact on
reducing recidivism beyond the effect of being arrested”).
175 SHELLY JACKSON ET AL., U.S. DOJ, NAT’L INSTITUTE JUST., BATTERER INTERVENTION
PROGRAMS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 1 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/195079.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY2F-JGDX].
176 Id. (explaining Duluth model is psychoeducational program “based on the feminist
theory that patriarchal ideology, which encourages men to control their partners, causes
domestic violence”); Linda G. Mills, Briana Barocas & Barak Ariel, The Next Generation
of Court-Mandated Domestic Violence Treatment: A Comparison Study of Batterer
Intervention and Restorative Justice Programs, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 65, 68
(2013).
177 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 175, at 1; Mills, Barocas & Ariel, supra note 176, at 68.
178 See, e.g., Mederos, supra note 151, at 130-31 (explaining how Duluth batterer
intervention groups “were situated in a community-wide framework of institutions that held
physically abusive men accountable”).
179 See, e.g., John Hamel, “But She’s Violent, Too!”: Holding Domestic Violence
Offenders Accountable Within a Systemic Approach to Batterer Intervention, 4 J.
AGGRESSION, CONFLICT & PEACE RES. 124, 124 (2012) (noting that “holding domestic
violence perpetrators accountable for their abusive behavior is the number one objective of
batterer intervention programs”). DVIPs are also referred to as Batterer Intervention
Programs (“BIPs”) and Spouse Abuse Abatement Programs (“SAAPs”). JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 175, at 1.
180 LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 173, at vii (stating that 34% of courts responding to
survey “reported ordering 75% to 100% of offenders to a batterer program”).
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or domestic violence, and that they have little to no impact on reoffending.”181
In part, their lack of success arises from a failure to prioritize internal
accountability. One comprehensive review of state DVIPs found that “[o]nly
three jurisdictions list the therapeutic rehabilitation of the offender as a goal.”182
In light of this and of the limited success rates of DVIPs generally, external
accountability (through retribution) appears to be the accountability goal
prioritized for this most prevalent treatment intervention.183 While external
accountability alone may achieve some goals of the anti-IPV movement, the
limited impact DVIPs have on meaningful behavior change is profoundly
relevant to the goal of survivor safety and overall violence reduction.
Beyond critiques of the effectiveness of the content of the curriculum, DVIPs
have been criticized for how they essentialize and shame perpetrators.184 The
nearly exclusive programmatic focus on patriarchal motivations for violence
fails “to distinguish among men who abuse their partners”185 or to assess the
treatment needs of individual perpetrators and, as such, is at odds with
psychological and sociological research.186 In his seminal 2007 book, Coercive
181 Ramsey, supra note 117, at 367-68 (citing research that supports male offender who
finishes DV intervention program based on either Duluth Model or cognitive-batterer
intervention program “is only five percent less likely to re-assault his female partner than
a man who has only been arrested and convicted in the criminal justice system”); Domestic
Violence Courts: Batterer Programs, U.S. DOJ: NAT’L INSTITUTE JUS. (June 30, 2011),
https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/domesticcrime/intimate-partner-violence-courts/interve
ntions/Pages/batterer-interventionprograms.aspx [https://perma.cc/6CXB-TU99] (noting
that all domestic violence courts mandate batterer programs to some degree and that
estimated “one-third of domestic violence courts refer almost all offenders to these
programs”); Intimate Partner Violence Interventions: Interventions—Batterer Programs,
U.S. DOJ: NAT’L INSTITUTE JUS. (July 6, 2011), https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/intimatepartner-violence/interventions/Pages/batterer-intervention.aspx [https://perma.cc/6P5V7H73] (noting that while intervention programs have success with some, there is no
consensus as to what percentage of men cease their violent behavior as result of
participation in such programs).
182 Ramsey, supra note 117, at 376 (examining batterer intervention programs to
demonstrate general “focus on accountability, rather than treatment”).
183 See id. (“The focus on accountability, rather than treatment, is evident in the methods
group facilitators are instructed to use.”).
184 Bob Wallace & Anna Nosko, Working with Shame in the Group Treatment of Male
Batterers, 43 INT’L J. GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 45, 51-52 (1993) (explaining that group
therapy can cause men to feel shame and become defensive).
185 GOODMARK, supra note 132, at 148.
186 Id. at 147-49 (arguing that ignoring complexity of men who abuse “significantly
decreases the likelihood that interventions with those men will succeed” and reporting
“there is significant debate about the effectiveness of these programs”). Failure to create
curricula that are racially and culturally specific and that address the motivations for
violence within certain racial and cultural groups stems, in part, from an essentialization of
perpetrators. See Mederos, supra note 151, at 136 (explaining that DVIPs are structured
without regard for psychological differences among abusive men). But see Ramsey, supra
note 117, at 366 (noting that “Duluth model’s official website denies that shaming is part
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Control, Evan Stark explores a variety of motivations for IPV.187 A year later,
sociologist Michael Johnson introduced “typologies of intimate partner
violence.”188 Still other lawyers, psychologists, and researchers have presented
differing frameworks for understanding the types of violence that occur within
intimate relationships.189 Indeed, the research that reasons beyond power and
control motivate IPV is so conclusive that according to Joan Kelly and Michael
Johnson, “[a]mong some social scientists, it is no longer considered
scientifically or ethically acceptable to speak of domestic violence without
specifying the type of partner violence to which one refers.”190
The failure to differentiate between motivations of perpetrators in an effort to
gain a broader understanding of their violence can lead to perpetrators feeling
“judged and disbelieved.”191 Yet, DVIPs remain consistently uniform. As
argued by Professor Leigh Goodmark, “given that women frequently return to
their partners after they enter treatment, assuming that the treatment will reduce
abuse, the legal system is endangering women by essentializing men.”192
Myopically focusing on one treatment intervention for all perpetrators ignores
other understood sources of violence and how those sources—including
of its methodology”).
187 See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE (Claire Renzetti & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2007) (discussing men’s
political, economic, and domestic motivations for abusing women).
188 MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM,
VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 67, 77 (Claire Renzetti ed.,
2008) (defining “intimate terrorism, violent resistance, and situational couple violence” as
types of IPV). According to Johnson and Joan B. Kelly, there are essentially four primary
categories of IPV: Coercive Controlling Violence, Violent Resistance (self-defense to
coercive controlling violence), Situational Couple Violence, and Separation-Instigated
Violence (violence that is “instigated by the separation [of a couple] where there was no
prior history of violence in the intimate partner relationship or in other settings”). Joan P.
Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence:
Research Update and Implications for Intervention, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476, 477, 487
(2008). Of those typologies, the most prevalent are situational couple violence and coercive
control. Id. at 489.
189 See, e.g., ELLEN PENCE & SHAMITA DAS DASGUPTA, REEXAMINING ‘BATTERING’:
ARE ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST INTIMATE PARTNERS THE SAME? 3 (2006),
http://praxisinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ReexaminingBattering-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6MZ-8TNW] (“Five distinct categories of domestic violence emerged
in our analysis.”).
190 Kelly & Johnson, supra note 188, at 477 (citing Michael P. Johnson, Apples and
Oranges in Child Custody Disputes: Intimate Terrorism vs. Situational Couple Violence, 2
J. CHILD CUSTODY 43, 43-52 (2005)).
191 Ramsey, supra note 117, at 372 (citing Donald G. Dutton & Kenneth Corvo,
Transforming a Flawed Policy: A Call to Revive Psychology and Science in Domestic
Violence Research and Practice, 11 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 457, 463 (2006))
(emphasizing shaming approach is not conducive to understanding causes of violence).
192 GOODMARK, supra note 132, at 150.
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poverty, race, and culture—are correlated with IPV and male identity.193
Assuming one predominant motivation limits a more robust or accurate response
to the “dynamics of the partner violence, the context, and the consequences” and
the ability to consider “appropriate sanctions, and more effective treatment
programs tailored to the different characteristics” of IPV.194
Additionally, attribution of traits or motivations disconnected from one’s
experience or understanding can increase feelings of humiliation,
embarrassment, or shame in the person against whom the motivations are
assumed.195 Rigidly standardized DVIPs that are driven to trigger cognitive
modification of specific beliefs and attitudes can “undercut[] one’s sense of
worth,” leaving a participant feeling that he is flawed and cannot change.196 The
group aspect of DVIPs (nearly all use classes and not individualized or targeted
treatment) further amplifies the shaming aspect of many DVIPs, making them
akin to other interventions where one’s wrongful behavior is publicized.197
Stated bluntly by Bob Wallace and Anna Nosko, DVIP groups can become “a
crucible of shame.”198
III. STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF SHAME AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
Perpetrators of IPV often have multiple shame-creating experiences over
their lifetimes. Poverty and childhood trauma, including trauma resulting from
childhood abuse, are strongly correlated both with IPV perpetration and with
shame. Understanding these shaming conditions enhances clarity about the risks
of sanctioning or tacitly accepting shame as an accountability intervention for
trauma survivors broadly, including those survivors who may perpetrate abuse
against another person.

See id. at 4 (listing “contextual variables” that impact violent relationships); Nancy
E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 201,
204 (2008) (arguing for intersectional analysis of men’s power in society).
194 Kelly & Johnson, supra note 188, at 477-78 (describing value of differentiating
among different types of partner violence).
195 See Dowd, supra note 193, at 238 (explaining stereotypes of masculinity affect men
“to the extent those constructions are inaccurate”).
196 GONDOLF, supra note 174, at 119 (describing shame as “complex issue” that can
cause man to feel he “doesn’t deserve anything better”).
197 See JOHNSON, supra note 188, at 73 (“[T]he most common approach . . . involves
group sessions . . . .”).
198 Wallace & Nosko, supra note 184, at 52-53 (“The very fact of having to attend a
group . . . may trigger for the man a sense of being flawed.”).
193
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Poverty
1.

Poverty, Unemployment, and Shame

Those who live in poverty are among the most stigmatized people in the
United States and around the world.199 While poverty is generally understood as
a condition that impacts one’s monetary access and resources, poverty also has
a psychosocial dimension.200 Poor people often report suffering “pain from
mockery, taunting, and the assault on their human dignity and individuality”—
core components of shame—as a result of their poverty.201 Shame can be a cause
or consequence of poverty, or both;202 people living in poverty often feel
ashamed at being unable to meet societal expectations due to their lack of
resources.203 That feeling of shame can undermine confidence and individual
agency; lead to depression, sullenness, and disintegration; contribute to
increased feelings of shame; and perpetuate the cycle of poverty.204
Cultural messaging about individuals living in poverty consistently assumes
their individual responsibility for the economic conditions within which they
live.205 Discussions of poverty are often separated from discussion about the
structural conditions that perpetuate it, crafting a narrative that poverty results
from personal failure or ineptness.206 Poverty is roundly viewed as a “selfinflicted” condition, not as a condition of circumstances beyond an individual’s
control or the result of long-standing policies, including those that are racially
biased.207 As a result, poor individuals are often met with curtness and
negativity—even contempt—in their interactions with families, communities,
199 See generally WALKER, supra note 16 (discussing “poverty-shame nexus
incorporating stigma”).
200 Id. at 120 (“[S]hame is very often central to the experience of poverty.”); Reyles,
supra note 21, at 405 (analyzing nexus of societal shame, humilitation, and poverty).
201 NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 225 (“One of the most stigmatized positions, in all
societies, is poverty.”).
202 WALKER, supra note 16, at 188 (“The primary cause of poverty—lack of income
variously attributable to complex combinations of restricted employment opportunities,
limitations of health, age, education and development, and cultural and security
constraints—is added to by the mix of stigmatization and external and internal shame that
can exacerbate, deepen, and perpetuate [poverty].”).
203 Id. at 97.
204 Id. at 182.
205
Id. at 56 (“[T]he public . . . readily view[s] most poverty as being selfinflicted . . . .”).
206 Id. at 67-68 (“[P]ublic discourse . . . associates poverty with personal failings rather
than with structural determinants . . . .”).
207 Id. at 57 (“‘Welfare’ in the United States has traditionally been heavily stigmatized
because it is widely identified with receipt by African Americans.”); Loren Miller, Race,
Poverty, and the Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 386, 386 (1966) (identifying American public’s
reluctance to admit U.S. Constitution “condoned and permitted discrimination” against
African Americans).
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and the agencies responsible for helping them.208 According to Diego Zavaleta
Reyles:
The sense of humiliation and shame that poverty can bring relates to many
aspects of life: it can result from being unable to do what is customary in
society; from having to accept alms or special treatment; from encounters
with officials and those delivering services; or from belonging to segments of
society to which negative values are attached (e.g. in many contexts, poverty
is associated with laziness, incompetence or criminality).209
A cultural perception also exists that poor people behave shamelessly—in
ways that are “selfish, exploitative, and loathsome.”210 By way of example,
people who make a choice to use their food stamps or other state-sponsored
financial aid on certain kinds of food or cell phones or other nonessential needs,
as defined by others, often report being publicly judged and humiliated, accused
of using the system, taking advantage of taxpayer money, or abusing their
“handout.”211 Relatedly, unemployment contributes to profound feelings of
distress, humiliation, and shame by reinforcing assumptions about one’s
capacity and one’s responsibility for their unemployment, even if that
unemployment resulted from external causes.212 The shame attached to
unemployment can be particularly acute for men who may find themselves
unable to meet societal expectations of breadwinning for their families.213 As
208 NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 182 (listing “deeply rooted and long-standing patterns
of thought” such as “belief that the poor cause their poverty”); WALKER, supra note 16, at
97, 151 (explaining that society makes impoverished people feel ashamed and detailing
discrimination against poor people in various welfare schemes worldwide).
209 Reyles, supra note 21, at 407.
210 WALKER, supra note 16, at 89.
211 Isaac Bailey, Stop Shaming Poor People for Being Poor, CNN (Mar. 29, 2017, 7:07
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/opinions/stop-shaming-poor-for-being-poor-baile
y/index.html [https://perma.cc/G668-TJ8X] (describing “scorn” from Americans “who
express disgust at the sign of someone paying for a steak with an EBT card”); Simcha
Fisher, The Day I Bought Steak with My Food Stamps, PATHEOS (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/simchafisher/2015/04/17/the-day-i-bought-steak-with-myfood-stamps/ [https://perma.cc/83EQ-WEE6] (describing one woman’s experience with
both being ashamed of being on food stamps and with experiencing judgment of others as
she purchased steak for her family after saving up for months).
212 Charlotte Bilo, Psycho-socio Consequences of Poverty – Why It’s Important to Talk
About Shame, SOCIALPROTECTION.ORG (June 15, 2017, 1:43 PM), http://socialprotection
.org/learn/blog/psycho-socio-consequences-poverty-–-why-it’s-important-talk-aboutshame [https://perma.cc/285K-H5EP] (“[B]eing unemployed often evokes a feeling of
uselessness.”).
213 Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity, in SEX, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY: THE NEW BASICS: AN
ANTHOLOGY 58, 60-61, 66 (Abby L. Ferber, Kimberly Holcomb & Tre Wentling eds.,
2009) (further noting that one man’s employment failures led to “shame,” “humiliation,”
sense of “personal ‘failure,’” and despair when “he has ceased being a man among men”).
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noted by one researcher, men often attribute unemployment “to themselves as
worthless failures who are less than men.”214 Consequently, and for many of the
reasons identified in the next Section, unemployment and its resulting shame
serve as the “strongest contextual risk factor” for IPV.215
2.

Poverty and Aggression

As explored in this Article, shame, poverty, and aggression are linked. It is
unsurprising, then, that many perpetrators of IPV live within conditions of
poverty.216 Low family income, coupled with the resulting stress, is statistically
correlated with family violence.217 Indeed, IPV strongly correlates with poverty,
“economic deprivation and subjectively perceived economic strain.”218 Rates of
IPV are nearly twice as high in households that live at or below the federal
poverty level as compared to households living at one hundred to two hundred
percent above the federal poverty level.219 Women living in households where
the annual income is less than $7,500 experience nearly seven times more IPV
than do women in households where the annual income is $75,000.220 Up to
214 Kevin L. Fall, Homeless Men: Exploring the Experience of Shame (Dec. 2014)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa), http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.c
gi?article=5494&context=etd [https://perma.cc/3FS4-KXGA] (emphasis omitted).
215 Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal Is Political—and Economic: Rethinking
Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 421-22 (2007) (“Individual perceptions of
declining economic well being contribute to family distress, conflict, and violence.”).
216 Id.; see also KATHRYN COLLINS ET AL., FAMILY INFORMED TRAUMA TREATMENT
CTR., UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TRAUMA AND URBAN POVERTY ON FAMILY
SYSTEMS: RISKS, RESILIENCE, AND INTERVENTIONS 21 (2010), https://www.nctsn.org/sites/
default/files/resources/resource-guide/understanding_impact_trauma_urban_
povertyfamily_systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPX5-RLDM] (“Adults surviving the stress
of urban poverty are . . . more likely to experience multiple traumatic events.”).
217 COLLINS ET AL., supra note 216, at 12, 21, 32 (arguing level of stress is due, in part,
to “poor interpersonal interactions in the family and . . . hopelessness about the future”);
see also Ramsey, supra note 117, at 353-54 (finding that in “late nineteenth-century New
York City . . . at least 12 of the 17 men convicted of first-degree domestic murders between
1879 and 1893 were working-class or unemployed” and that during the Temperance
Movement “more than half of the men executed for domestic murders in turn-of-thecentury New York were portrayed as drunks who depended on the meager earnings of their
female intimates for liquor money”).
218 Donna Coker & Ahjané D. Macquoid, Why Opposing Hyper-Incarceration Should
Be Central to the Work of the Anti-Domestic Violence Movement, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC.
JUST. L. REV. 585, 610 (2015) (noting that “[p]oor women suffer significantly higher rates
of domestic violence”).
219
ACLU, supra note 135, at 7 (“[I]ntimate partner violence rates for households living
at or below the federal poverty level (FPL) are nearly double the rates of those living at
101% -200% of FPL.”).
220 Id. When their income increases to $24,999, women remain around three times more
likely to suffer physical violence than women with annual incomes over fifty thousand
dollars. SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DOJ, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER
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sixty-five percent of women receiving welfare benefits experience relational
violence.221 As Robert Walker noted in his book, The Shame of Poverty:
Sometimes persons experiencing poverty are depicted as shameless, resisting
the humiliation heaped on them, occasionally in ways that demonstrate moral
strength and resilience but more often through the adoption of antisocial
behaviour that turns out to bring them no benefits and often to make matters
worse. Shame felt on the inside is portrayed as destructive, with people in
poverty engaging in fantasy and self-deception, retreating into themselves
and into a spiral of despair, depression, and failure that sometimes ends in
violence or suicide.222
The stress and hopelessness of poverty can also cause some to experience
frustration or anger. That anger may well up “uncontrollably from the sense of
shame itself, sometimes from the frustration of being unable to stem the source
of the shame, and sometimes from the apparent inability to do anything at all.”223
Violence is a common outlet for that anger and, as explored above, the shame
from living in economically strained conditions.224 For males in particular,
violence serves to “ward off the shame and feared abandonment” that can result
from not being able to fulfill their traditional masculine roles and serves to
reinforce a socially valued form of masculinity—aggression.225 Povertyinduced anger begins young: children growing up in poverty are more prone to
anger than are children growing up in more financially secure homes.226
Despite the understood correlation between IPV and poverty, analysis of the
economic structures of communities and households as context for DV has been
dismissed as an excuse for avoiding perpetrator accountability and remains
“largely absent from the debates” on how best to respond to it.227 Professor
Deborah Weissman, who has written on the correlation between market
VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BY5K-Q6HG] (reporting statistics of IPV across various demographics).
221 Terrence D. Hill, Krysia N. Mossakowski & Ronald J. Angel, Relationship Violence
and Psychological Distress Among Low-Income Urban Women, 84 J. URB. HEALTH 537,
537 (2007) (“[B]etween 34 and 65% of women receiving welfare report some form of
relationship violence in their lifetime.”).
222 WALKER, supra note 16, at 97.
223 Id. at 88.
224 Weissman, supra note 215, at 421 (“Anger, humiliation, and despair experienced in
the workplace are transferred to the home and . . . influence rates of family dysfunction and
domestic violence.”).
225 Wallace & Nosko, supra note 184, at 50.
226
See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 216, at 11-12 (explaining impoverished children
experience extremely high rates of trauma and “chronic anger”).
227 Ramsey, supra note 117, at 359 (“[M]any factors associated with intimate-partner
violence—including . . . poverty—were dismissed as myths or excuses.”); Weissman,
supra note 215, at 405-06 (“[E]conomic hardship and the demise of community resources
[are] social conditions by which domestic violence is both cause and effect.”).
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conditions, economic insecurity, and IPV, has argued that the relationship
between DV and economics has been “undertheorized due to fear that domestic
violence would receive less attention as just one more problem emanating from
a culture of poverty.”228 However, as explored in Part IV, advocating for the
improved economic conditions of both survivors and perpetrators may be
among the most critical interventions needed to reduce violence in intimate
relationships.
B.

Trauma, Family-of-Origin Abuse, and Shame

Traumatic experiences, including those arising from living in poverty, “have
a tremendous impact on future violence victimization and perpetration.”229
Children growing up in poverty face extremely high rates of trauma230 and
children living in urban poverty are routinely exposed to particular categories of
trauma, including trauma arising from low neighborhood safety, racial
discrimination, food instability, and exposure to substance abuse.231 Exposure
to violence in poor, often urban, environments also is common—many poor
children experience the death of a family member, family violence, parental
abandonment, or parental maltreatment.232 The correlative trauma that can arise
from living in poverty disproportionately impacts communities of color due to
the racial makeup of many urban communities.233 As a result of their
experiences, children growing up in extreme poverty “are more likely than those
growing up in other contexts to experience multiple traumas and . . . to thus
Weissman, supra note 215, at 436 (“[F]ocus on economic forces . . . serves to
illustrate the ways in which current global economic restructuring often contributes to
despair and violence.”).
229 See, e.g., Michael T. Baglivio et al., The Prevalence of Adverse Childhood
Experiences (ACE) in the Lives of Juvenile Offenders, 3 J. JUV. JUST. 1, 2 (2014) (“Adverse
childhood experiences refer to the following 10 childhood experiences researchers have
identified as risk factors for chronic disease in adulthood: emotional abuse, physical abuse,
sexual abuse, emotional neglect, physical neglect, violent treatment towards mother,
household substance abuse, household mental illness, parental separation or divorce, and
having an incarcerated household member.”); Massaro, supra note 3, at 664 (noting that
many psychologists believe “that ‘[m]any violent children lash out . . . because . . . they are
highly prone to shame (that is why so much violence is triggered by acts of disrespect).’
Shame can provoke externalization of blame or other responses, including a reduced
capacity for empathy” (footnote omitted)).
230 COLLINS ET AL., supra note 216, at 12 (stating children growing up in poverty often
display symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”)). One study found that
between seventy and one hundred percent of children screened had symptoms of trauma.
Id. at 11 (“Studies of children living in poor inner-city neighborhoods document extremely
high rates of exposure to trauma (70-100%) . . . .”).
231 Id. at 12.
232 Id. at 11.
233 See id. at 4 (noting that impoverished urban neighborhoods are disproportionately
represented by families of color).
228
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develop complex symptoms of traumatic distress”234 or meet the diagnostic
criteria for complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).235 Complex
PTSD results from chronic trauma characterized by multiple, interpersonal
traumatic events.236 A complex PTSD diagnosis carries into adulthood: “Adults
surviving the stress of urban poverty are not only more likely to experience
multiple traumatic events; they are also more likely to develop trauma-related
symptoms that impact their functioning, health and well-being.”237
Shame can, and commonly does, result from traumatic experiences
regardless of one’s own victimization as a result of that trauma. Reflecting this
correlation, in 2013 the DSM-5 was updated to include the following diagnostic
criteria for PTSD: “persistent negative emotional state[s] (e.g., fear, horror,
anger, guilt, or shame).”238 Shame is also a characteristic of other mental health
diagnoses including “obsessive-compulsiveness, psychoticism, anxiety, and
depression” because of the ways people blame themselves for such mental health
conditions or because of how others respond to the underlying behaviors that
lead to a person’s diagnosis.239
In part because of the impact of shame, trauma—including trauma resulting
from childhood abuse and victimization—is also directly correlated with
violence perpetration.240 As noted by one psychologist regarding the most
violent men in our culture:
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12-13.
236 Id. at 11-12 (stating children in urban poverty are more likely than others to develop
complex symptoms of traumatic distress).
237 Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
238 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) (emphasis added). Researcher June Tangney and others call this
“global devaluation”—identification of oneself as corrupt and not just one’s behavior. See,
e.g., TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 37, at 117 (discussing DSM-IV and its diagnostic
criteria); Taylor, supra note 35, at 4 (stating it is possible shame diverted into anger could
account for frequency of anger reactions in PTSD).
239 Stuewig et al., supra note 21, at 91 (citations omitted). Guilt, on the other hand, has
been found to be “unrelated or inversely related to psychological problems.” Id. at 92.
Mental health issues, including those arising from traumatic experiences, often lead to
substance abuse—another risk factor for IPV. See Robert F. Anda et al., The Enduring
Effects of Abuse and Related Adverse Experiences in Childhood, 256 EUR. ARCHIVES
PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 174, 181 (2006) (“We found a strong relationship
between early adverse experience and substance use and abuse (illicit drugs, alcohol, and
nicotine) later in life.”). Substances may be used to self-medicate underlying mental health
conditions that arise from previous traumatic, often shameful, experiences and substance
abuse is strongly correlated with use of violence in intimate relationships. Kenneth Corvo
& Pamela Johnson, Sharpening Ockham’s Razor: The Role of Psychopathology and
Neuropsychopathology in the Perpetration of Domestic Violence, 18 AGGRESSION &
VIOLENT BEHAV. 175, 178 (2013) (finding suspected links between substance abuse and
domestic violence).
240 Charles L. Whitfield et al., Violent Childhood Experiences and the Risk of Intimate
234
235
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As children, these men were shot, axed, scalded, beaten, strangled, tortured,
drugged, starved, suffocated, set on fire, thrown out of the window, raped, or
prostituted by mothers who were their pimps. For others, words alone shamed
and rejected, insulted and humiliated, dishonored and disgraced, tore down
their self-esteem and murdered their soul.” For each of them the shaming
“occurred on a scale so extreme, so bizarre, and so frequent that one cannot
fail to see that the men who occupy the extreme end of the continuum of
violent behavior in adulthood occupied an equally extreme end of the
continuum of violent child abuse earlier in life.”241
While many, if not most, of the individuals who perpetrate IPV do not have
histories with such extreme experiences of abuse, nor are they necessarily the
most violent men in our culture, it is likely that perpetrators of IPV have had
past traumatic experiences or have been victimized by violence themselves. As
one example, researchers found that “large numbers of [traumatized]
Iraq/Afghanistan combat veterans returning home after repeated tours of duty”
who were diagnosed with PTSD were at increased risk of engaging in IPV.242
Rates of severe violence were over twenty-five percent for perpetrators/service
members with PTSD, as compared to three percent for service members without
a PTSD diagnosis.243 In another study, out of 501 African American men
enrolled in a DVIP, the vast majority (between eighty-five to ninety percent)
had been exposed to trauma through interpersonal violence as preteens,
teenagers, and adults.244 Trauma and childhood family-of-origin violence also
are correlated with IPV victimization: female children who experience family
aggression and violence are at increased risk of being an adult victim of IPV by
a rate of three times over women who have not had such experiences.245 As a
Partner Violence in Adults, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 166, 166 (2003) (stating
“violent childhood experiences increased the risk of victimization or perpetration of IPV”).
241 RONSON, supra note 19, at 247-48 (quotation omitted).
242 Corvo & Johnson, supra note 239, at 177 (noting how, following these large numbers
of traumatized veterans returning home, “there has been an increase in the research linking
PTSD and domestic violence”).
243 Id. Other studies have suggested that the “presence of PTSD ha[s] a 2-8 times
multiplier effect on the incidence of domestic violence.” Id. at 178.
244 GONDOLF, supra note 174, at 156-57.
245 Whitfield et al., supra note 240, at 178 (stating how violent childhood experiences
increased risk in women of victimization of IPV). This study supports other research that
correlates adverse childhood experiences and victimization. See Alicia Clark & David Foy,
Trauma Exposure and Alcohol Use in Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 37,
37 (2000) (finding IPV and childhood sexual abuse of women positively correlated with
alcohol use). A related aspect of trauma and IPV is trauma arising from traumatic brain
injury (“TBI”). TBI arises most often from blunt trauma to the head from accidents, sports,
or assaults. This form of trauma has been positively associated with violence—according
to one study, men who perpetrated violence had head injury rates ten times the rate of the
general population. Corvo & Johnson, supra note 239, at 179 (“[R]eports rates of head
injury among domestic violence perpetrators of 40-61%, as much as 10 times the rate in
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result, interventions designed to address conditions that both contribute to and
result from childhood trauma may lead to improved outcomes for perpetrators
and for the individuals they harm.
IV. RESISTING SHAME: DIGNITY-ENHANCING INTERVENTIONS
Shame’s counterpoint is dignity. Whereas shame can denigrate one’s sense
of self-worth, dignity can elevate the inherent value of a person, regardless of
their perceived moral shortcomings or contrary social behavior.246
Accountability interventions that protect the dignity of wrongdoers are more
likely to have a positive impact on behavior change than are shame-driven ones.
Prioritizing dignity requires individually targeted and socially responsive
interventions over those that subvert or ignore distinctions among individuals.247
This Part explores four approaches to IPV that prioritize perpetrator dignity—
without sacrificing accountability—in an attempt to reduce the harmful
outcomes that can result from shame and the conditions that perpetuate it.
A.

Labels and Language

Labels have a profound impact on an individual’s behavior and how others
behave towards him.248 When applied in a way that feels true to a person’s
experience, labels can lead to empowerment and validation—dignity enhancing
the general population.”).
246 See Epstein, supra note 127, at 1846 (identifying related value in procedural justice);
Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 66 (2011)
(exploring philosophical and legal meanings of dignity and differing views on identifying
and integrating dignity as mandate within U.S. legal system); Margaret E. Johnson, A Home
with Dignity: Domestic Violence and Property Rights, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1, 10 (2014)
(concept of human dignity often is equated with each individual’s inherent worth); MeltzerHenry, supra note 66, at 215 (providing multiple definitions of dignity as used by the
Supreme Court, including personal integrity as dignity). James Gilligan, a leading
researcher on shame and violence, found that a small change in treatment of prisoners made
a huge difference. He noted that, when prisoners were treated with respect and not shame,
violence in prisons “dropped astoundingly.” RONSON, supra note 19, at 251 (interviewing
James Gilligan); see Massaro, supra note 3, at 650 (“Shame is central to individual
emotional development, and doubtless influences the creation and enforcement of social
norms; but governmental attempts to manipulate and explore shame through public
humiliation rituals may be far more complicated, costly, and counterproductive than the
reformers seem to appreciate.”).
247 NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 52 (“[A] concern with the dignity of the offender should
always be solidly built into the system of punishment, and, with it, the idea of eventual
reintegration of the offender into society.”).
248 See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling
Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 20, 21 (1983) (“[T]he bulk of the self-fulfilling
prophecy literature . . . finds that confirmation effects are often produced when racial,
ethnic, or other negative social labels are implicated—exactly those cases in which one
expects perceivers to refrain from using category-based information.”). See generally
ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM (1968).
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outcomes.249 In the converse, naming a person as his behavior, in ways that feel
contrary to his experience, or about a characteristic over which he cannot
control, can contribute to feelings of self-doubt, a loss of self-worth, and can
dramatically impact the individual’s behavior and the behavior of others towards
him.250 A study from 1968 elucidates this point: Two psychology researchers
told elementary school teachers that “some of their students had scored in the
top twenty percent of a test designed to identify ‘academic bloomers’—students
who were expected to enter a period of intense intellectual development over
the following year.”251 In actuality, the students were selected at random, and
performed no differently from their peers on an academic test.252 A year after
“convincing the teachers that some of their students were ‘due to bloom,’” the
researchers returned to the school and administered that same test.253 The results
showed that the labeled students scored higher.254 The study concluded that
students’ scores increased because the teachers’ behavior towards them
changed, resulting in the labeled children achieving far higher results than their
non-labeled counterparts, not because the children were any smarter than their
peers. In other words, while the label may matter to an individual’s identification
of his or her self-worth or capabilities, the behavior others attribute to that label
may have a more influential effect on that individual.255
Many feminists and other anti-IPV advocates routinely essentialize
perpetrators through the labels and language used to describe them, despite long
demanding the resistance of essentializing survivors. The terms “battering” and
“battered woman,” while initially used to provide accessible terminology to
draw attention to the issue of male violence against women, have been criticized
for assuming one type of violence in intimate relationships and one type of
victim.256 Defining women who experience violence at the hands of their
intimate partners as “battered women” has been critiqued as conveying a
narrative of “powerless and passive objects of another’s violence, helpless to
249 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 132, at 146-47 (arguing that domestic violence “law
and practice overemphasize women’s short-term safety in ways that deprive women of
dignity and agency”).
250 See, e.g., Darley & Gross, supra note 248, at 20 (finding that certain stereotypical
information, such as socioeconomic status, “creates not certainties but hypotheses about [a]
stereotyped individual” and that “these hypotheses are often tested in a biased fashion that
leads to their false confirmation”).
251 ROSENTHAL & JACOBSON, supra note 248, at 72-97 (“The basic question to be
answered in this chapter is whether in a period of one year or less the children of whom
greater intellectual growth is expected will show greater intellectual growth than the
undesignated control-group children.”).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 This is known as the “Pygmalion Effect” or a form of self-fulfilling prophecy. Id.
256 BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 87 (1989).
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free themselves from the constraints imposed by the ‘batterer.’”257 These
observations have led to a critical recognition among many within the anti-IPV
movement that women harmed in intimate relationships should be afforded
differentiation “so that the experience of a single group of women does not drive
and dominate feminist analysis.”258 Instead, survivors’ goals and their
individualized experiences should guide their response and the response of
others to the abuse inflicted upon them, not a predetermined outcome or set of
assumed goals.
Yet, those of us committed to violence reduction risk losing credibility about
the harms of essentializing survivors when describing those who inflict abuse.
As with “battered woman,” there is clear social and political meaning attached
to “batterer”—a person sanctioned through a patriarchal society to engage in
IPV.259 This term is filled with deeply held, negative expectations that
perpetrators lack the willingness or capacity to change. “Batterers” are culturally
understood to engage in the worst of behavior—violence against women that is
“premeditated, escalating, terroristic, [and] chronic.”260 The term rests on an
assumption that there is something innately wrong with men who perpetrate
abuse. However, “batterer” is a social construct, not a psychological condition.
Identifying which individuals or groups are morally “flawed”—and why—is
strongly connected to existing cultural norms and political movements.
Professor and legal historian Carolyn Ramsey has identified how the violence
men used on their wives during the Temperance campaign was identified as
“alcohol-fueled degeneration, rather than being rooted in men’s primal
nature.”261 Prior to the Temperance movement, Puritans saw men’s behavior as
“irresponsible, violent-tempered sinners”—a religious failing rather than a
psychological trait.262 Most recently, first- and second-wave feminists shifted
257 Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between
Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019,
1024 (1997). The term “battering” also assumes a type of violence that is “continuous,
repeated, and unrelenting,” denying the experiences of “women occasionally hit—even hit
only one time—by their intimate partner.” HOOKS, supra note 256, at 87. Further, battering
and the “battered woman” are constructed predominantly from a narrative crafted to define
the white, heterosexual woman. Shalleck, supra, at 1023. Even “victim” and “survivor”
have been identified as inaccurately defining experiences of individual women. See, e.g.,
Kim, supra note 68, at 14 (describing woman who did not want to self-identify as survivor
but rather victim, because that felt true to her experience of being sexually assaulted).
258 Dowd, supra note 193, at 203.
259 Ken Corvo & Pamela J. Johnson, Vilification of the “Batterer”: How Blame Shapes
Domestic Violence Policy and Interventions, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 259, 268
(2003); Shalleck, supra note 257, at 1023.
260 Corvo & Johnson, supra note 259, at 261.
261 Ramsey, supra note 117, at 350.
262 Id. at 349 (“In contrast to colonial New Englanders, who saw wife beaters as
irresponsible, violent-tempered sinners, nineteenth-century Americans offered a different
diagnosis.”).
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the source of IPV to “the man who violently asserts his dominance over his
powerless female victim.”263 In other words, today’s “batterers” are the
“alcoholics” and “sinners” of decades past, a framing that has dominated the
social and political responses to IPV for the past fifty years.
This modern narrative—that IPV is driven by a desire to dominate and
control—“reinforces commonly held assumptions and beliefs, such as that all
domestic violence has the same pattern” and that all perpetrators have the same
personality characteristics.264 By way of example, one shelter director observed:
Batterers do what they do because it works. They don’t have much motivation
to change, because they are not really held accountable in the community at
large. In their worldview, they believe that they are entitled to use violence in
order to control their partners. They mostly get what they want using violence
so what is the motivation to change?265
Assuming one motivation or dominant trait of all perpetrators harms the
individuals so labeled by failing to see and respond to their individual
experiences. It also harms survivors by narrowing the potentially viable
solutions to IPV, collapsing “important distinctions along various dimensions
of the problem—degree of severity, for example, or periodicity or
occurrence.”266 While unity of motivations may make it easier to craft
standardized accountability interventions, that unity is at odds with previously
described sociological and behavioral research about the variety of motivations
that contribute to IPV perpetration and ignores best practices for effectively
intervening in harmful behaviors.267
Labels also matter because, simply, words matter. Words have been identified
as being “singularly the most powerful force available to humanity . . . . Words
have energy and power with the ability to help, to heal, to hinder, to hurt, to
harm, to humiliate, and to humble.”268 They impact how one is seen and how
263 Id. at 355-56 (“This second-wave movement almost inevitably relied on a simple but
potent image—the man who violently asserts his dominance over his powerless female
victim—to raise public awareness about the gendered harms of intimate partner abuse and
to galvanize state action against it.”).
264 Corvo & Johnson, supra note 260, at 261.
265 GONDOLF, supra note 174, at 17.
266 GOODMARK, supra note 128, at 146; see WALKER, supra note 16, at 142-43 (noting
that people in poverty are repeatedly labeled in pejorative ways, leading to erosion of
understanding for circumstances within which poor people find themselves). As recounted
by bell hooks, “My partner was angry to be labeled a batterer by me. He was reluctant to
talk about the experience of hitting me precisely because he did not want to be labeled a
batterer.” HOOKS, supra note 256, at 88.
267 See supra Section II.A (discussing IPV, accountability, and state-sanctioned shame);
see also JOHNSON, supra note 188, at 65 (discussing essential variability of situational
couple violence); STARK, supra note 187, at 103 (discussing specialized institutional means
developed to realize goal of accountability for offenders).
268 Yehuda Berg, The Power of Words, HUFF POST: BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010, 1:45 PM),
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one views oneself. Labels, and the interventions that flow from the assumptions
attached to those labels, threaten dignity by judging individuals on the basis of
a single trait, making them “unable to present themselves as composed,
dignified, whole selves capable of human virtue.”269 Changing the language
used to describe perpetrators of IPV may seem a minor suggestion for an
extremely complex social problem. However, doing so opens up a more nuanced
understanding of perpetrators and IPV. Moving from a singular classification of
violence in intimate relationships to one that allows for distinguishing of
individuals and experiences can reduce one’s own maladaptive expectations of
oneself, and can set in place conditions for accountability directed at the
individual rather than the group to which one is assumed to belong.270
B.

Beyond Retributive Accountability: Economically Targeted Rehabilitative
Interventions

Retribution and criminal accountability have been priorities of the anti-IPV
movement for decades. However, as bluntly stated by one set of researchers,
while criminalization of IPV “may deter some acts of violence in the short
term . . . as an overall strategy for ending violence, [it] has not worked.”271
Increasingly, some feminist scholars have called for a shift in priorities of the
anti-IPV movement away from criminalization for a variety of reasons,
including its ineffectiveness as a response and to better advance the goals and
autonomy of survivors.272 Decriminalization would also reduce the shaming that
can be inherent in court sentencing and avoid judges who justify the use of
shaming sentences.
While this Article does not call for decriminalization of IPV, it does urge
consideration of how the attendant consequences of criminalization may
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/yehuda-berg/the-power-of-words_1_b_716183.html
[https://perma.cc/JH5Q-FDMH].
269 Meltzer-Henry, supra note 66, at 216.
270 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 127, at 1874 (“These responses, however, can only be
effective if batterers actually comply with police directives, with judicial orders setting
conditions for pretrial release, sentencing, probation, and parole, and with court-issued civil
protection orders.”); see also BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND
REDEMPTION 17-18 (2014) (“Each of us is more than the worst thing we’ve ever done.”).
271 Critical Resistance and INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, Gender
Violence and the Prison-Industrial Complex, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE!
ANTHOLOGY 223, 223 (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2006) (“[T]he
overall impact of mandatory arrest laws for domestic violence have led to decreases in the
number of battered women who kill their partners in self-defense, but they have not led to
a decrease in the number of batterers who kill their partners.”).
272 See generally Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be Decriminalized, 40
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 53 (2017) (discussing how time may be “ripe to consider alternatives
to criminalization of intimate partnet violence” given current focus on overcriminalization
and decreasing mass incarceration).
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increase shame or the conditions that contribute to it, and therefore, increase
IPV perpetration.273 Specifically, criminalization can intensify the shameinducing condition of poverty: For poor individuals, incarceration, convictions,
and the time required to attend DVIPs or other probation requirements can
perpetuate their chronic economic instability. The causes for such instability
range from job loss due to needed time off for court mandates, to employers
refusing to hire persons with particular convictions for safety or reputational
concerns. While the standardized punitive interventions may be appropriate for
certain particularly violent, unstable, or repeat offenders, for others, more
targeted interventions may more effectively respond to the conditions
understood to contribute to IPV. Those interventions could be identified through
the advancement of problem-solving justice. Within the context of IPV, there
may be no more effective intervention than those targeted to improve the
economic circumstances of perpetrators.274
Problem-solving justice, delivered through problem-solving courts, is driven
by the principle that “the justice system will achieve better outcomes by
addressing the underlying problems that bring people into the system, not just
the specific offenses for which they are arrested.”275 Problem-solving courts
have been utilized in response to a variety of social and systemic challenges in
the United States. The Conference of State Court Administrators has
recommended that problem-solving courts target their efforts on high-risk and
high-need participants.276 Jurisdictions use problem-solving justice to address
litigants’ mental health issues and homelessness;277 provide individualized

Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175 (2004) (“Others seem
undeniably to have found an effect on crime rate, but we suspect that much, if not most, of
this is the result of incapacitative rather than deterrent effects.”).
274 Bilo, supra note 212 (“While the material resources needed to prevent one from
feeling ashamed vary across cultures and levels of economic development, the emotional
experience of poverty-induced shame and its impacts are almost universal.”).
275 Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, Foreword to GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT,
GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE (Quid Pro Books 2015).
276 Suzanne M. Strong, Ramona R. Rantala & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Census of ProblemSolving Courts, 2012, U.S. DOJ, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (2012),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpsc12.pdf [https://perma.cc/84ES-V2Y] (“In 2012,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) Census of Problem-Solving Courts (CPSC) counted
3,052 problem-solving courts in the United States. The most common types of problemsolving courts were drug courts (44%) and mental health courts (11%). Most courts (53%)
reported that they were established prior to 2005, including drug (64%), youth specialty
(65%), hybrid DWI/drug (63%), and domestic violence (56%) courts.” (citation omitted)).
277 See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts and Pragmatism, 73 MD. L.
REV. 1120, 1149 (2014) (“[M]ental health/homeless courts make available to clients a
variety of services, including mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, housing
and government benefits assistance, family counseling, employment counseling, and job
training.”).
273
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support for drug dependence;278 and increase compliance with child support
orders.279 Although specialized domestic violence courts are sometimes
identified as “problem-solving,” those courts generally “do not view defendant
rehabilitation as a high-priority part of the problem-solving process. This differs
sharply from most problem-solving courts. Rather, the mission of domestic
violence courts concentrates more on the promotion of victim safety and
external offender accountability.”280
Yet, given the role of economic instability in IPV perpetration, problemsolving courts that identify perpetrator rehabilitation as a priority warrant real
consideration. Child support problem-solving courts provide a framework for
responding to the economic conditions that contribute to a social and legal harm.
Similar to perpetrators of IPV, parents who fail to financially support their
children fall within a category of persons for whom empathy and understanding
are not easily afforded. Yet, following years of sentencing fathers to jail for lack
of compliance with child support orders, many lawyers and judges now
recognize that fathers often live within conditions of severe poverty or have
felony convictions that restrict their ability to work, and therefore, their ability
to pay.281 An Urban Institute study confirmed this recognition by finding that
nearly three-quarters of high-child-support debtors had no reported income or
reported incomes of ten thousand dollars a year or less, and that seventy percent
of arrears were owed by obligors who were similarly financially situated.282 This
data has led to a shifted perspective that incarcerating fathers for being
“deadbeats” is often akin to incarcerating the poor for their poverty. Today,
some child support courts have moved from the imposition of prison time for
noncompliance to program-to-work options.283 The goal of these programs is to
278 See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach,
22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 135-36 (2004) (describing New York’s drug courts).
279 See generally STATE COURT ADMIN. OFFICE, MICH. SUPREME COURT, CHILD SUPPORT
SPECIALTY COURTS PILOT PROGRAM: PROCESS EVALUATION (2011) (evaluating efficacy of
Michigan problem-solving court pilot programs aimed at increasing child support
payments).
280 How Do Domestic Violence Compare to Other Problem-Solving Courts, CTR. FOR
CT. INNOVATION (Aug. 7, 2005), https://www.courtinnovation.org/articles/how-do-domest
ic-violence-compare-other-problem-solving-courts [https://perma.cc/2EXD-6DU9].
281 Elaine Sorensen, Liliana Sousa & Simon Schaner, Assessing Child Support Arrears
in Nine Large States and the Nation THE URBAN INST. 3 (2009), https://www.urban.org/
research/publication/assessing-child-support-arrears-nine-large-states-and-nation/view/
full_report [https://perma.cc/AN8M-CYJF].
282 Id.
283 Tina Griego, Locking Up Parents for Not Paying Child Support Can Be a ModernDay ‘Debtor’s Prison,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014, 7:20 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/09/26/locking-up-parents-for-not-paying-child-supportcan-be-a-modern-day-debtors-prison/?utm_term
= .f47f03ed2fd1 (“That shift, still
underway, has seen the rise of new partnerships between child support enforcement, the
courts, social service agencies and fatherhood programs seeking to figure out what’s
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address the foundation of the problem: lack of income. Georgia, for example,
has adopted Parental Accountability Courts (“PACs”) “to remove barriers to
non-payment of child support, such as unemployment, substance abuse, low
level education.”284 The overarching goal of PACs is to keep people out of jail
for failing to pay child support while simultaneously increasing compliance.285
Virginia has a similar program designed to achieve employment preparedness
through the provision of specific skills training, among other interventions.286
Critical distinctions clearly exist between the harms that result from IPV
perpetration and those that result from child support noncompliance. Yet, both
often have roots in poverty and economic instability. As such, within the context
of IPV, a problem-solving approach for many cases involving IPV could lead to
better outcomes for perpetrators and violence reduction generally. Courts could
offer job training or other economically supportive programs to perpetrators
who are otherwise determined eligible (due to the nature of the abuse, their prior
histories, etc.) in lieu of other criminal or punitive interventions. Monitoring and
counseling in support of economic stability (along with other targeted
interventions that may impact economic stability, including mental health and/or
drug treatment) in a problem-solving court setting could meet the public’s and
the survivor’s demand for accountability, while also responding more directly
and effectively to the economic conditions that contribute to abuse. CPOs could
allow survivors to request job or vocational training for the person against whom
they seek protection if that remedy furthers the survivor’s legal goals. Economic
intervention programs such as these could be paid for by shifting funding from
DVIPs, resulting in a leveling of costs.

keeping parents from paying the child support they owe. And then - this is the seismic part
- helping those parents address their issues instead of locking them up.”).
284 Child Support and Incarceration, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 6, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-incarceration.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S5WV-M3UR] (“Georgia has a series of problem solving courts, also
called Parental Accountability Courts, which seek to remove barriers to non-payment of
child support, such as unemployment, substance abuse, low level education. The
overarching goal of these courts is to keep people out of jail for failing to pay child support,
and to obtain support payments.”).
285 Griego, supra note 283 (“[C]hild support enforcement workers are reaching out to
employers. [sic] trying to help parents facing jail find jobs and other support they need this, in a state that not long ago sought to publicly shame fathers who owed child support
by putting their names, faces and money owed in newspapers.”).
286 A. Ellen White & Craig M. Burshem, Problem Solving for Support Enforcement:
Virginia’s Intensive Case Monitoring Program, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 54 (2012),
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2012/home/Courts-and-theCommunity/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends%202012/PDFs/ProblemSolving
_White.ashx [https://perma.cc/54EC-C6FH] (“Through the Intensive Case Monitoring
Program, Virginia has helped noncustodial parents facing incarceration overcome the
barriers that prevent them from paying child support.”).
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Anti-IPV advocates and lawmakers may find shifting priorities to attend to
the needs of perpetrators to be too politically perilous given the vast needs of
survivors, grant limitations, and limited social empathy for perpetrators.287
Responding to the social conditions of perpetrators also may be perceived as
excusing abuse or betraying a commitment to survivors288 or as depriving
survivors, courts, or communities of the interventions needed to hold
perpetrators adequately accountable for the harm they have caused. These
concerns, however, assume a clear line between interventions that “benefit”
perpetrators and those that “benefit” survivors. As noted by Fernando Mederos,
“the aversion to approaches that do not focus on [standardized] accountability
has crystalized into a fear that to focus on other issues with [offenders] means a
wholesale abandonment of concern for safety for [survivors] and for holding
offenders responsible for their conduct.”289 Promoting creative, economically
driven interventions for perpetrators might do more to disrupt the complex
connections between shame, poverty, and IPV than existing interventions
have.290 Meaningful economic interventions could reduce the shame felt
particularly powerfully by unemployed men, increase their sense of dignity and
self-worth, reduce further involvement with the legal system, and ultimately
lead to overall violence reduction.291 Moreover, attending to the economic
In response to centuries of state and public complacency, feminists and anti-IPV
advocates were able to bring the epidemic of violence against women into the national
spotlight in the early decades of the 20th century through identification of violence against
women “as a form of misogyny practiced by men for the purpose of subordinating women
and to which the State was complicit.” Weissman, supra note 215, at 394. “[T]he collective
view of women—subordinated and under the control of the individual patriarch and of the
Patriarchy.” Miccio, supra note 46, at 250.
288 See GONDOLF, supra note 174, at 124 (noting, in context of DVIPs,
“[u]nderstandably, some advocates dig in their heels against what they perceive as an
increasing onslaught of psychological treatments for men who have criminally attacked,
abused, and injured women and children”); Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer
Accountability in the Child Protection System, 93 KY. L.J. 614, 653 (2004) (“Engaging
batterers on an emotional level—as people rather than criminals—raises flags for some
domestic violence advocates, who fear that reinforcing batterer’s responsibility of their
violence will be lost in discussions of abusive childhoods, feelings of confusion or selfdoubt, or concerns about children.”); Deborah M. Weissman, The Community Politics of
Domestic Violence, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2017) (identifying how dominant
carceral responses to DV are indifferent to “structural sources of domestic violence as a
problem”).
289 Mederos, supra note 151, at 135.
290 See Goodmark, supra note 272, at 101 (“[A]lternatives to the criminal legal system
must prioritize redressing the harm to the victim over reintegrating offenders. Nonetheless,
while neither restorative justice nor community accountability programs are currently
viable options in most communities, they could, if properly developed, provide an
alternative to criminalization.”).
291 See Weissman, supra note 215, at 387 (“[M]en precluded from fulfilling the
dominant model of masculinity as a result of their subordinated role in the workplace often
287
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circumstances of perpetrators also may improve a survivor’s economic
outcomes by increasing the likelihood of receiving child support or other
financial support from her partner, or, if she remains with him, stability and
economic security. More globally, as argued by Professor Martha Nussbaum,
“There are many reasons for societies to concern themselves with securing a
decent living-standard for all citizens, since life, health, educational opportunity,
meaningful work, and a decent opportunity to develop one’s mental faculties all
have intrinsic importance.”292
Finally, beyond perpetrators, many survivors have vast economic needs—
needs that restrict the options available to them to respond to their abuse.293
Advancing the economic conditions of survivors294 would provide critical
assistance needed to exit an abusive relationship and to maintain that
separation.295 Improving the economic conditions of survivors may also lead to
positive consequences for reducing IPV perpetration generally: lifting women
out of poverty or providing them opportunities to separate from an abusive
relationship will impact their children, who otherwise might grow up in
potentially trauma-laden or abusive conditions. One outcome from their
mother’s improved economic conditions may be an overall reduction in the
childhood shame they experience from poverty or trauma, and the adult violence
that is statistically correlated with both.
C.

Judicial Prioritization of Dignity

Judges have profound power to impact a person’s experience and to influence
a broader collective belief in the legitimacy of the legal system. “Ensuring that
an accused person is treated with fairness, respect, and neutrality enhances the
morality and decency of our justice system.”296 In some ways, reducing
stigmatizing shame in courtrooms is quite simple: judges must be committed to
the preservation of dignity of all parties, even the most egregious of offenders,
and must avoid sentencing orders that intentionally denigrate, humiliate, or
resort to ‘“hypermasculinity’ (the exaggerated exhibition of physical strength and personal
aggression) in an attempt to gain social status.’” (citing Angela Harris, Gender, Violence,
Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 785 (2000))).
292 NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 238.
293 Economic abuse often contributes to or causes those hardships. Id.
294 Johnson, supra note 246, at 1 (arguing for creation of “comprehensive theory that
addresses the rights to a home when there is domestic violence by focusing on each party’s
dignity, the importance of home and ending domestic violence, as opposed to merely
‘safety’”); see GOODMARK, supra note 132, at 186-91 (discussing establishing economic
security and engaging men who abuse).
295 ASHA DUMONTHEIR & MALORE DUSENBERY, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES.,
INTERSECTIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY (2016) (“Policies
ensuring employment protections can help remove the barriers that survivors face to
accessing safety and economic security.”).
296 Epstein, supra note 127, at 1873-74.
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publicly shame wrongdoers. Training to educate judges on the correlations
drawn in this Article can provide necessary context for understanding the risks
of shame broadly and, specifically within the context of IPV, how humiliation
or degradation may be counterproductive or even dangerous to the victims the
court may be trying to protect.
Judges—and other system actors—also can enhance the dignity of parties
appearing in their courtrooms through the same ideas that support the theory
behind procedural justice. Fundamental to procedural justice is the treatment
of all individuals with respect, which positively “affects compliance [with court
orders] regardless of whether the ultimate result is viewed as right or wrong.”297
For reasons identified elsewhere in this Article, shaming may work against court
order compliance. When a person is denigrated or embarrassed—when he is
deprived of dignity—that person is more likely to perceive the source imposing
the directive as less legitimate and therefore, the issued order as unfairly
imposed.298 One result from “sanctions imposed in a manner that harms a
person’s dignity” is an increase in future offending.299 By contrast, a
commitment by judges to defend the dignity of litigants and embrace procedural
justice can lead to increased legitimacy of courts through a reduction in statesponsored denigration of wrongdoers and, for IPV specifically, increased
survivor safety through increased perpetrator compliance with the orders
intended to protect them.
D.

Restorative Justice and the Potential of Reintegrative Shame

Reintegrative shame is foundational to many restorative justice models.
Indeed, many restorative justice models are built on materializing the utilitarian
benefits of shame by using public- and community-driven conferences or circles
to enforce standards of behavior.300 Restorative justice can provide survivors
and perpetrators opportunities for interventions outside of the “standard
procedures of criminal and civil law,”301 resulting in “other avenues of support
for healing and accountability, rather than a short period of incarceration of the
offender.”302 Indeed, many survivors identify community condemnation of the
Id. at 1875.
Id. (“If people feel unfairly treated by a government official or a court proceeding,
they will perceive the source as less legitimate and, as a consequence, obey its orders less
frequently.”).
299 Id. at 1877.
300 JAMES PTACEK, RESEARCH ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CASES OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE 160 (2017) (“There are three common forms of Restorative Justice used in IPV
cases: victim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, and peacemaking and
sentencing circles.”).
301 Herman, supra note 8, at 571.
302 ERIKA SASSON, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, CAN RESTORATIVE PRACTICES ADDRESS
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE?: SUMMARY OF A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 1 (2016),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/Intimate_Partner_Restorati
297
298
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offense as more important than punishment, retribution, or rehabilitation.303
Restorative justice models allow victims to describe the harm they have
experienced and ask the wrongdoer to publicly accept responsibility for that
harm.304 Such interventions can help achieve vindication from the community
“as a rebuke to the offenders’ display of contempt for their rights and dignity”305
and can help craft creative and targeted interventions designed to address the
impact of, and impetus for, the caused harm.306 From the perspective of the
wrongdoer, restorative justice can provide a supportive space for gaining
empathic understanding of the victim’s experience, admitting responsibility,
and being accepted back into his community.
Proponents of restorative justice identify that educating wrongdoers about
social norms of behavior can reduce the “negative stigmatization of the
individual” by focusing on the act with a goal of reintegration of the
individual.307 Restorative justice can also provide an alternative to the
stigmatizing experiences that can result from a perpetrator’s interaction with the
legal system and reduce the uncertainty that can come from judicial power.
For the reasons laid out in Part I, shame experienced within a reintegrative
context can lead to internal and external accountability for the harm caused.
Moreover, such experiences may be critical to gaining empathy and modifying
maladaptive behaviors. However, because restorative justice models rely both
on publicizing wrongdoing and on community standards of behavior,
participants and facilitators must be committed to resisting the stigmatic
shaming of perpetrators for their abuse, while also preventing the historical
shaming imposed on survivors—assuming or expecting certain behaviors in
response to IPV. Said differently, when utilized, restorative justice processes
must ensure strict commitment to the dignity of both parties,308 avoid blaming
ve_Roundtable.pdf [https://perma.cc/M25H-XB6D].
303 Herman, supra note 8, at 585 (“Beyond acknowledgment, what survivors sought
most frequently was vindication. They wanted their communities to take a clear and
unequivocal stand in condemnation of the offense.”).
304 Laurie Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative
Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
517, 535-36 (2010) (“Its central principles require the victim to have the desire and strength
to represent her needs and talk honestly and the offender to take responsibility for his
actions.”).
305 Herman, supra note 8, at 597.
306
Some standardized interventions include “apologies, restitution, and
acknowledgments of harm and injury.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What
Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 161, 162 (2007). But see Herman, supra
note 8, at 578 (noting that restorative justice movement has been highly defendant oriented
and has “reproduced many of the same deficiencies as the traditional justice system with
respect to victim’s rights”).
307 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 306, at 165.
308 See PTACEK, supra note 300, at 174. But see Herman, supra note 8, at 594 (“A few
[survivors] wished for the extreme consequence of shunning and community ostracism.”).
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survivors for the choices they have made, and demand a commitment to the
recognition of the whole perpetrator, not just the sum of his actions. Those who
support restorative justice interventions must pay critical attention to the
processes utilized to ensure that the utilitarian aspects of shame are upheld, and
the dignity-depriving ones are resisted, including avoiding processes that
propogate the shame-proneness to which a perpetrator may already be inclined.
These processes can include a commitment to support the perpetrator, not for
the violence used or to minimize or externalize blame, but to support his human
dignity.309 Additionally, when community members are present, facilitators
must work to ensure community condemnation is towards the action, not the
person.310 When implemented with a commitment to dignity preservation and
an understanding of the counterproductive harms of shame intended to humiliate
or stigmatize, restorative justice models are valuable options for achieving
perpetrator accountability, while simultaneously meeting survivors’ articulated
goals.311
CONCLUSION
Accountability for perpetrators of IPV is critical for survivor empowerment,
the external and state-sanctioned moral condemnation of abusive behavior, and
for modifying perpetrator behavior for the better. The correlation between
violence and shaming experiences, however, demands caution against
conflating shame with accountability. While shame can be an effective—indeed,
critical—tool for behavior modification, its effectiveness is heavily dependent
upon how it is imposed or experienced by an individual. Reifying or tacitly
condoning stigmatizing shame as an acceptable form of social control discounts
what is known about the negative impact of shame and its fallout in shaping
different, socially acceptable behavior. Shame as an intervention for individuals
who themselves may be shame-prone may be ineffective at best, and
counterproductive at worst. When imposed publicly or when done with the
intention to humiliate or embarrass, shame can increase violence and aggression.
Moreover, shaming as a tolerated intervention implicitly assumes that the person
shamed is “unusual” or “bad” or “morally adrift” and that the person who is
imposing shame is “usual” or “good” or “morally right.”312 As explored in this
Article, those distinctions ignore what is understood about the complex social

Menkel-Meadow, supra note 306, at 169 (citing NUSSBAUM, supra note 3).
Id.; PTACEK, supra note 300, at 174.
311
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 306, at 161 (“Restorative justice, which began as an
alternative model of criminal justice, seeking healing and reconciliation for offenders,
victims, and the communities in which they are embedded, has moved into larger national
and international arenas of reintegration in political and ethnic conflicts.”).
312 NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 217 (discussing how shame is related to moral judgment
about certain groups that are being shamed).
309
310
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conditions and experiences that contribute to IPV perpetration and what is
understood about trauma and victimization.
Prioritizing dignity over shame affords “all citizens the social conditions of
self-respect”313—even the least sympathetic among us. Those committed to
reducing IPV should demand of one another and of the systems within which
they intersect rejection of perpetrator essentialization and perpetrator shaming.
Protecting the dignity of survivors and perpetrators should guide any formal or
informal interventions imposed by judges or advanced by anti-IPV advocates or
the community at large. Interventions that are genuinely motivated by dignity
protection, including those that consider the systemic conditions that contribute
to IPV perpetration, are critical to effectively furthering the goals of perpetrator
accountability, survivor safety, and overall violence reduction.

313

Id. at 196.

